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INTRODUCTION

The source of income rules used in the United States and elsewhere
in large part establish the contours of income tax jurisdiction that is exercised
by countries.! Source rules do this by allocating a taxpayer's income for
purposes of assigning countries their rights to tax such income. 2 Thus, source
rules are of critical importance in the functioning of the income tax rules that
apply to cross-border business and investment activities.
The source rules play a vital role in the foreign tax credit system
applicable to U.S. persons with foreign investment or business activities.
This is because a U.S. taxpayer is subject to an annual foreign tax credit
limitation, which is generally equal to the taxpayer's average U.S. tax rate
multiplied by the taxpayer's foreign source income as determined under the
source rules. 3 The source rules also playa central role in the United States'
exercise of taxation over foreign persons with U.S. businesses or
investments. For the most part, only U.S. source income is subject to tax
under the U.S. tax regimes that apply to foreign persons.4 Moreover, if the
United States were to move to a full or partial territorial system for taxing
U.S. persons, the source rules would assume even greater importance given
that they would determine whether the United States would impose any tax
(as opposed to a residual tax) on the income of U.S. persons from crossborder activities. 5 Other countries likewise use source rules or their

1. See Hugh J. Ault & David F. Bradford, Taxing International Income: An
Analysis of the u.s. System and Its Economic Premises, in NATIONAL BUREAU OF
ECONOMIC RESEARCH, TAXATION IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 11, 13 (Assaf Razin &
Joel Slemrod, eds., 1990) ("The source rules are central to the taxing jurisdiction
asserted over both U.S. and foreign persons."); Stephen E. Shay, J. Clifton Fleming,
Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, "What's Source Got to Do With It?" Source Rules and u.s.
International Tax, 56 TAX L. REv. 81, 83 (2002) [hereinafter, Shay, Fleming &
Peroni, Source Rules] (noting that "the concept of 'source' is at the heart of
international taxation").
2. Compare this to the use of the arm's length method for allocating income
among commonly controlled entities. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 482. Thus, whereas the
arm's length method is used to allocate income among taxpayers, the source rules
are used to allocate income within a particular taxpayer.
3. See I.R.C. § 904(a), (d).
4. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b), 881(a), 882(a), 864(c).
5. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Exploring the Contours of
a Proposed u.s. Exemption (Territorial Tax System), 41 TAX NOTES INT'L 217,
226-227 (2006); cf HUGH J. AULT & BRIAN J. ARNOLD, COMPARATIVE INCOME
TAXATION: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS 447-48 (2010) (pointing out that in countries
using territorial systems, great pressure is placed on source rules because treating
income as foreign source may result in the income not being taxed anywhere if
countries use different source rules).
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equivalent in applying foreign tax credit or territorial systems to their
residents and exercising source taxation over nonresidents. 6
The current approach for sourcing income suffers from two related
problems. First, the source rules lack coherence in that they fail to advance a
consistent normative tax policy.7 While the U.S. rules are generally based on
the notion of sourcing income according to the location of economic
activities that generate the income, they also promote other policy concerns,
such as taxing income that is not likely to be taxed by foreign countries and
encouraging U.S. export activities. 8 More fundamentally, the source rules
used by the United States and other countries fail to reflect the consistent
application of the key principle appropriate for allocating nations' primary
taxing rights - namely, the benefits principle, under which income should
be sourced to the country that provides the taxpayer with significant
governmental benefits related to the derivation of the income. 9 The
connection to governmental benefits should be the guidepost for designing
source of income rules, because the source rules define the scope of source
taxation and source taxation is justified by governmental benefits provided to
a nonresident by the host country.IO Furthermore, even where the source
rules attempt to implement an economic approach for sourcing income - an
approach that can be consistent with the benefits principle - the rules in the
United States and elsewhere often produce distorted binary results: that is,
generally all of the income from a transaction is either domestic or foreign
source even though the relevant economic factors suggest that a division of
the income is warranted. II The results produced by these "single" source
·
ruIes at times
are arb·Itrary. 12
The second problem is the variation in the source rules used
worldwide. 13 This may produce double taxation - two or more countries
taxing the same income, a result that would impede the free flow of business
and investment capital. Or alternatively, differences in countries' sourcing
approaches can lead to non-taxation - no country taxing the particular
income, which may encourage tax motivated transactions.
This Article addresses both of these problems by offering an
approach for sourcing income that has the potential for being adopted by
countries on a multilateral basis. The Article develops an equity-based
standard for sourcing that would allow for the derivation of source rules for
various types of income. The core idea underlying the proposed sourcing
6. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 454-57,498-502,506-15.
7. See infra notes 84-106 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 60--61, 68 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 144-48 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 53-59, 94-96 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
13. See infra Part 1I.C.2.
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standard is the benefits principle, which calls for the sourcing of income on
the basis of related government benefits. To an extent, the proposed approach
is somewhat consistent with source rules currently used in the United States
and elsewhere. However, unlike the U.S. rules and those of some other
countries, the proposed approach would not take into account other policy
concerns, with the exception of administrability. Moreover, the suggested
approach would divide the income between geographical sources where
more than one country provides significant governmental benefits that
contribute to the earning or enjoyment of the income, whereas the current
rules typically assign income to a single geographical source. By basing the
source rules on a benefits principle-based standard that allows source to be
divided when appropriate, this Article seeks to rationalize and harmonize the
provisions used to source income for purposes of taxing cross-border
investment and business activities.
This Article differs from prior work in this area in two important
respects. First, it offers a multilateral approach for sourcing income, whereas
earlier studies of significance have taken a national approach, evaluating for
reform the source rules of the United States. 14 Second, unlike other
scholarship devoted to the source rules, the Article develops a single
standard for sourcing income that promotes equity by dividing the income
tax jurisdiction of countries based on the provision of government benefits
that relate to the income. Thus, the Article is important in that it develops an
equity-based standard for sourcing income that may gain international
acceptance. 15
Part II of the Article briefly describes source rules used in the United
States and other countries, reviews the principles underlying the current
source rules, and describes the significant problems caused by the current
approach. Part III develops a standard for devising source rules, first by
identifying the benefits principle and administrability as the appropriate
principles for developing the standard for sourcing income. This part then
formulates a standard that would devise source rules by evaluating the source
of income on the basis of three factors: the destination of the services,
property, or capital giving rise to income; the location(s) of the activities
giving rise to income; and the residence of the person receiving income.
14. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: International
Aspects of United States Income Taxation: Proposals of the American Law Institute
on United States Taxation of Foreign Persons and of the Foreign Income of United
States Persons (1987) (ALI PROJECT I); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules,
supra note 1.
15. This would be analogous to the international acceptance of the arm's
length principles to allocate income among commonly controlled entities. See, e.g.,
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 9 (2010) [hereinafter
OECD Model] (calling for the use of arm's length principles to allocate income
among associated enterprises).
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Based on this evaluation, the rule for a given type of income may divide the
source of the income among mUltiple locations. Part N then illustrates the
use of this standard by suggesting revised source rules for several types of
income. 16 Part V concludes the Article.
II. CURRENT SOURCE RULES: DESCRIPTION,
PRINCIPLES, AND PROBLEMS

This Part proceeds by briefly describing source rules used in the
United States and other countries. This is followed by a review of the
principles underlying the current source rules, and then a description of the
significant problems caused by the current approach.

A. Description of Current Source Rules
The current approach used in the United States and other countries
for sourcing income is to provide separate source rules for particular types of
income. Thus, there are different rules for several categories of income, such
as interest, dividends, service income, rents, royalties, and various types of
property gains. In addition, while technically not source rules, statutes and
treaties have provisions that limit or eliminate countries' exercise of source
taxation. What follows is a brief description of these rules.

1. Interest and Dividends
Interest income is typically sourced based on the residence or place
of incorporation of the borrower. 17 This rule is usually overlaid with
exceptions for business-related interest, under which interest that is
associated with a business that is conducted outside the borrower's country
of residence or incorporation is sourced according to the actual or presumed
16. This Article will not address the related subject of sourcing deductions,
that is, linking expense deductions to income from different sources. For purposes of
both source and residence taxation, it is often necessary to determine the net income
from different sources. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882 (a), 904(a). This requires that
deductions be allocated and apportioned to income from different sources. Under the
U.S. rules, deductions are generally matched to gross income based on the factual
relationship between the deductions and income. See Regs. §§ 1.861-8, 8T. There are
also special allocation and apportionment rules for interest expense and research and
development costs. See Regs. §§ 1.861-9, 9T, lOT, 17. While determining
appropriate rules for sourcing deductions is certainly important in crafting
harmonized source rules, this issue will be left for a future endeavor.
17. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(I); OECD Model, supra note IS, at art. 11,
para. 5; see also Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 510 (stating that interest is
generally sourced where the payer is resident).
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location of that business. IS Similar to interest, dividends are generally
sourced according to the place of incorporation of the corporation paying the
dividend,19 with exceptions for situations where the corporation derives a
significant portion of its income outside its country of incorporation. 20
While the source rule for interest would indicate that the borrower's
country of residence would generally have taxing rights over the interest
payments, in most cases source taxation is prevented. Many countries have
statutes that provide tax exemptions for domestic source interest received by
foreign persons.21 In addition, income tax treaties between countries usually
give the country where the interest recipient resides the exclusive right to tax
interest income. 22 For dividends, treaties typically reduce source taxation by
limiting the source country tax rates on dividends to either fifteen or five
percent. 23

2. Rents and Royalties
Rental income from the leasing of tangible property is traditionally
sourced at the location of the leased property.24 Royalty income from
licensing intangible property is sourced using a similar, property destinationtype approach, but there are differences among countries in carrying out this
approach. Under U.S. law, the source of royalty income is determined
according to the place where the intangible is used. 25 The place of use is
typically the country that is providing the legal protections that relate to the

18. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A), (B); OECD Model, supra note 15, at
art. 11, para. 5. Under U.S. law prior to 2011, interest paid by a U.S. corporation or
resident alien was generally treated as foreign source interest in its entirety if the
payer met the 80 percent foreign business requirements contained in section 861 (c)
(so called 80120 companies rule). See I.R.C. § 861(a)(1)(A) (prior to 2011). For
taxable years beginning after 2010, the 80/20 source rule has been repealed, although
a similar rule applies to exempt from U.S. source taxation interest (as well as
dividends) paid by "existing 80/20 companies" (as defined in section 871(1)(1». See
I.R.C. § 871(i)(2)(B), (I), 881(d).
19. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861 (a)(2); OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 10.
20. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B).
21. See AM. LAW INST., FEDERAL INCOME TAX PROJECT: International
Aspects of United States Income Taxation II: Proposals of the American Law
Institute on United States Income Tax Treaties 194 (1992) (ALI PROJECT II); see,
e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (portfolio interest exemption); I.R.C. §§ 871(i)(2)(A),
881(d) (bank deposit interest exemption).
22. See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention of November 15,2006,
art. 11, para. 1 [hereinafter U.S. Model].
23. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 10, para. 2.
24. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(4).
25. See id
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intangible. 26 In other countries, royalties are often sourced based on the
residence of the payer or the country from which payment is made?7 Despite
the source rules for royalties, income tax treaties typically prevent the source
country from taxing royalty income that is received by residents of the other
treaty country. 28
3. Service Income
A few approaches have emerged for sourcing income from the
performance of services. Some countries, including the United States, source
service income according to where the services are performed. 29 Other
countries apply a service destination approach and focus instead on the
country in which the services are utilized?O Some countries use both
approaches and determine a domestic source for service income if the
services are either preformed or utilized in the particular country.3l
4. Property Gains
There are several approaches for sourcing gains from the disposition
of property, with the particular approach based on type of property that is
involved. For sales of inventory property that is purchased by the taxpayer
(as opposed to being produced by the taxpayer), the United States generally
sources the income on the basis of where beneficial ownership and risk of
loss pass to the buyer - the so-called title passage rule.32 Other countries
appear to focus on the country where the sales activities giving rise to the
income takes place. 33 For sales of inventory property that is produced by the
26. See Stephen E. Shay, et aI., Report of the Task Force on International
Tax Reform, 59 TAX LAW. 649, 773 (2006) [Hereinafter Shay, et aI., Task Force].
27. ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21 at 199; See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5
at 513 (discussing the implicit source rule under the Australian non-resident
withholding tax, which effectively treats royalties - as well as interest and
dividends - paid by residents as Australian source income).
28. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 12, para. 1.
29. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 86I(a)(3).
30. ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 57; see ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21,
at 7; Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 506.
31. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 57.
32. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(6); Reg. § 1.861-7(c).
33. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 456 (discussing the source rule for
export sales of inventory used by Japan for purposes of its foreign tax credit
limitation, which treats income from such sales as foreign source only if effected
through a foreign branch or in other circumstances that subject the income to a
foreign tax). The United States uses this approach in treating income as U.S. source
where the income is derived by nonresidents from sales of property that are
attributable to a U.S. fixed place of business. See I.R.c. § 865(e)(2).

2011J

Sourcing Income Among Nations

573

taxpayer, the United States generally sources 50 percent of the income to the
country that is the situs of the production activities and 50 percent of the
income to the country where title to the goods passes to the buyer. 34 Other
countries similarly divide the source of the income between production and
sales activities, but they may use different methods for determining the
amount of income that is attributable to the production and sales activities?5
Although technically not source rules, U.S. statutory and regulatory
provisions prevent the exercise of source taxation over inventory income
unless the nonresident is conducting a trade or business in the United
States. 36 Similarly, treaties condition the exercise of source taxation over
inventory income and other forms of business profits on the existence of a
permanent establishment in the source country by the nonresident/ 7 which is
generally a fixed place of business through which the business is
conducted. 38
The United States generally sources gain on the sale of other types of
property based on the residence of the seller. 39 Under this rule, gain from the
sale of a financial asset, such as corporate stock, by a foreign person would
generally be foreign source. 40 Most other countries also generally source
investment gains based on the residence of the seller.41 However, several
countries, contrary to the U.S. rule, do impose a source tax on gains realized
by a nonresident on the sale of stock in a resident corporation. 42 Under the

34. See Reg. § 1.863-3.
35. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 8. In addition, other countries
would probably focus on the location of the sales activities as opposed to where title
passes in sourcing the sales portion of such income.
36. See I.R.C. §§ 871(a), (b), 881(a), 882(a), 864(b); Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)
(excluding most gains from the definition of FDAP income, which is the base of the
U.S. gross basis source tax regime).
37. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 7.
38. See, e.g., OECD Model, supra note 15, at art. 5.
39. See I.RC. § 865(a).
40. See I.R.C. §§ 865(a), 865(g). There are other limitations on the source
taxation of gains from sales of stocks or securities. Under U.S. law, the trading of
stocks or securities is generally not considered to be a U.S. trade or business for
purposes of U.S. net basis source taxation, and stock or security gains are generally
not subject to U.S. gross basis source taxation. See I.R.C. §§ 864(b)(2), 871(a), (b),
881(a), 882(a); Reg. § 1.1441-2(b). In addition, treaties generally prevent the source
taxation of stock or security gains. See, e.g., U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 13,
para. 6.
41. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 202.
42. See id.; Joseph L. Andrus, Determining the Source of Income in a
Changing World, 75 TAXES 839,844 (1997); Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 49798, 509; Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-Border Tax Problems of Investment Funds,
60 TAX LAW. 583,585 (2007) (stating that many countries tax nonresidents on stock
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U.S. rule, gain on the sale of an intangible would generally be sourced
according to the residence of seller.43 An exception exists for contingent
payment sales, in which case the gain is sourced under the royalty rule
discussed above. 44 Gains from sales of real property are sourced in the
country in which the real property is located. 45 In the United States, U.S.
source treatment also applies to gains from indirect holdings of u.s. realty
through U.S. corporations whose principal assets are U.s. real estate.46
B. Principles Underlying the Current Source Rules
A comprehensive rationale has never been offered for the source
rules that exist in the United States and other countries. 47 Instead, the current
rules are a product of balancing a complex set of conflicting principles,
considerations, and claims as they apply to particular income types. 48
1. Connection to Governmental Benefits/Economic Nexus
An important principle used in formulating source rules is the view
that income should be sourced to the country that provides governmental
services and protections that are used in deriving the income. 49 In practice,
this policy is usually carried out by associating income with a geographic
source based on an economic nexus between the income and a particular
gains with respect to "local corporations, at least where such corporations are not
publicly traded and locally listed").
43. See I.R.C. § 865(a).
44. See I.R.C. § 865(d)(I); supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
45. ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37; see, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 86 I (a)(5),
897(c).
46. See I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(5), 897(c).
47. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Andrew Walker, Exceptions in
Search of a Rule: The Source and Taxability of "None of the Above" Income 4
(Columbia Law School Tax Policy Colloquium, 2009), http://www.law.columbia.
eduinulVdownload? &exclusive=filemgr.download&file)d= 153762 (stating that
there is no obvious unifying principle that explains the existing U.S. source rules).
48. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Walker, supra note, 47 at 5; cf
STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF
PRESENT-LAW RULES RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL TAXATION, JCX-40-99 (1999)
(stating that various factors determine the source of income for U.S. purposes,
including the location or nationality of the payer and recipient, and the location of
the activities and assets that generate income).
49. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Lawrence Lokken, What
is this Thing Called Source? 3-5 (Miami Law Research Paper Series, 2011),
http://ssrn.comlabstract=1795265 [hereinafter Lokken, Source] (stating that several
source rules can be explained by a principle that sources income based on the
location of governmental services and protections utilized in earning income).
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country. 50 Thus, in determining the source of income from activities, the
focus is typically on the country in which income-producing activities
occur. 51 Likewise, the source of income derived from property or capital is
often determined to be the country where the property or capital is used. 52
Income may well have an economic nexus to two or more countries.
For example, a bank may perform lending activities in one country in
connection with a loan made to a borrower who resides in another country; in
this case, there would be a conflict between the activities and utilization
bases for sourcing income. 53 Or the conflict could involve the activities basis
alone, for example, where two selling branches participate in one sales
transaction. In most cases, the source rules resolve such conflicts by sourcing
the income to one of the countries involved. 54 This is often determined by
deciding which country has the stronger source claim,55 based either on the
country with the aspects of the transaction that have the greatest economic
significance56 or the country that is providing the most important public
benefits related to the derivation of the income. 57 Sometimes conflicting
source claims are resolved by determining whether one of the competing
countries is likely to tax the income, a principle that is discussed below. 58 In
some cases, however, source conflicts are resolved by dividing the income
between two countries; for example, this approach is used to source
inventory income where the inventory is produced in one country and sold in
another. 59

50. See, e.g., U. S. Treas. Dept, THE PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE
CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH, AND SIMPLICITY 399 (1985) [hereinafter
TREASURY II] (stating that appropriate source rules "should reflect the location of the
economic activity generating the income and the source of legal protections
facilitating the earning of that income"); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; cf
MICHAEL 1. McINTYRE, THE INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAX RULES OF THE UNITED
STATES 3-67 to 3-68 (1996) [hereinafter McIntyre, Tax Rules] ("To the extent
possible, income should be sourced in a country where it has some economic
nexus."). As discussed below, economic nexus is an incomplete surrogate for the
benefits principle. See infra note 152 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note, 14 at 19.
52. See id.
53. See id.
54. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 865(e)(2).
55. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19.
56. See id. at 45.
57. See Lawrence Lokken, The Sources of Income From International Uses
and Dispositions of Intellectual Property, 36 TAX L. REv. 233, 239-40 (1981)
[hereinafter Lokken, Intellectual Property].
58. See infra Part II.B.2.
59. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
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2. Expectation that Another Country Will Be Taxing the Income

Another principle that is sometimes used to source income is
whether it is expected that other countries will be taxing the income. 6o The
United States uses this principle in sourcing several types of income for
purposes of the foreign tax credit limitation.61 The concern underlying this
principle is international under taxation. That is, if income is included in
calculating a residence country's foreign tax credit limitation, but the income
is not taxed by another country, the taxpayer would be able to cross-credit
excess foreign tax credits on other foreign income against the pre-credit
residence country tax on the income, thus resulting in effectively no tax or a
reduced tax on the income. 62 Similarly, if the residence country uses a
territorial system, exempting income that is not taxed by another country
would mean that no country is taxing the income.
To prevent this, a residence country can use the expected-to-tax
principle to treat income as domestic source, thus removing it from either the
foreign tax credit limitation or foreign income exemption. When used, this
principle may serve as a tiebreaker in determining source where the income
has an economic connection to two or more countries, but only one of the
countries is expected to tax the income. 63 Because of a concern that the
expected-to-tax principle still allows for substantial cross-crediting
opportunities, some commentators go further and call for an investigation of
whether it is feasible to treat income as foreign source for foreign tax credit
limitation purposes only where a foreign country imposes a significant tax on
the income. 64 In this regard, some countries use a subject-to-tax requirement
for exempting foreign income under territorial tax systems. 65
60. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 99TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, at 917-18,933 (1987) [hereinafter
1986 BLUEBOOK]; Andrus, supra note 42, at 843-44.
61. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 917-18, 932-33 (sales of
personal property; income from space and certain ocean activities).
62. See id. at 917-18.
63. Cf McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-68 to 3-69 ("To the extent
feasible, income with an economic nexus in more than one country should be
sourced in a country that is inclined to subject the income to taxation.").
64. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 151-52; see
also Robert 1. Peroni, A Hitchhiker's Guide to Reform of the Foreign Tax Credit
Limitation, 56 SMU L. REv. 391,396 (2003). These commentators acknowledge the
administrative difficulties of such an approach.
65. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 150; see
also I.R.C. § 865(e)(1) (personal property gains of U.S. residents otherwise subject
to residence-based sourcing are treated as foreign source where the sale of the
personal property is attributable to an office or fixed place of business maintained by
the U.S. resident in a foreign country, provided that at least a ten percent income tax
is actually paid to a foreign country with respect to the gain).
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3. National Interests Unrelated to Traditional Tax Policy Goals
A country's national interests unrelated to traditional tax policy goals
may also affect the design of source rules. For example, the United States
uses the source rules in order to provide export incentives. In 1986 the
United States generally repealed the title passage rule for sourcing personal
property gains because it did not want U.S. taxpayers to be able to generate
foreign source income on sales that were not likely to be subject to a foreign
tax (an application of the expected-to-tax principle discussed above).66 Such
low or non-taxed foreign income could be used to absorb excess foreign tax
credits on high-taxed foreign income. 67 However, the United States retained
the title passage rule for sales of inventory out of a concern that the repeal of
this rule for inventory sales would create difficulties for U.S. businesses
competing in international commerce, especially given the substantial U.S.
trade deficit at that time. 68 Thus, the United States' continued use of the title
passage rule for inventory sales is a form of export incentive.
In addition, as mentioned above, many countries, including the
United States, generally provide tax exemptions for domestic source interest
income received by nonresidents. 69 The purpose for the portfolio interest
exemption is to allow domestic borrowers unrestricted access to the
Eurobond market, where debt securities are generally free of taxes withheld
at source and where the issuer would generally be required to pay interest net
of any source tax. 70 To the extent that a source withholding tax is imposed, a
borrower in the Eurobond market would generally have to gross up the
interest payment to cover the taX. 7l The exemptions for interest promote
national, non-tax policy objectives by allowing less costly borrowings by
domestic persons, as well by encouraging non-residents to lend money to
residents of a particular country. 72
66. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 918.
67. See id.
68. See id.
69. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
70. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF
1984, at 388-89 (1984).

71. See id.
72. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 195 (stating that the U.S. tax
exemptions for interest reflect a policy judgment that it is critical to stimulate or
preserve the willingness of non-residents to lend to U.S. borrowers); Yoram Keinan,

The Case for Residency-Based Taxation of Financial Transactions in Developing
Countries, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 1,26 ("The portfolio-interest exception is perhaps the
purest example of enlightened self-interest and realism in attracting foreign capital."
(quoting from Dan R. Mastromarco & Lawrence A. Hunter, The Us. Anti-Savings
Directive, 2002 TNT 247-28)). Similarly, the U.S. rules that generally treat the
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4. Principles Reflected in Treaties
As noted above, treaties typically limit a country's exercise of source
taxation by reducing or eliminating the withholding tax on investment
income such as interest, dividends, and royalties. 73 An important reason for
the reduction of withholding taxes on investment income is to avoid
excessive taxation by the source country.74 Gross basis withholding taxes
that take no account of expenses associated with the income can result in a
very high rate of tax on the net income from a transaction. The quintessential
example is interest income derived by a financial institutional upon relending
funds that are borrowed from others; in this situation, a significant gross
basis tax may be confiscatory in that it could exceed the amount of net
income from the transaction. 75
Another, apparent reason for treaty provisions that reduce or
eliminate source taxation on investment income is the notion that the source
country's claim to tax such income may be considered to be relatively
weak. 76 The fact that the general elimination of the source tax on interest
applies not only to financial institutions but also to other interest recipients
suggests that another principle is at work besides preventing excessive
source taxation. 77 Likewise, the treaty rate on dividends, typically fifteen
percent, seems lower than necessary to address concerns of a high rate of
source tax on net income, given the degree of associated expenses usually
incurred in connection with portfolio investments. 78

trading of stocks or securities as not constituting a U.S. trade or business were
enacted to encourage foreign persons to invest in U.S. capital markets. See id. at 54.
73. See supra notes 22-23, 28 and accompanying text.
74. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 9.
75. See id.
76. See id. at 194 (referring to this as a possible basis for the general treaty
elimination of source taxation of interest income); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg,
Taxing International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REv. 537, 569 (2003) (stating that
the source country's claim to tax portfolio income is more attenuated than its claim
to tax business income and that the claims of the residence country seem to deserve
priority in the inter-nation allocation of tax jurisdiction over portfolio income;
pointing out that primary allocation of taxing rights over portfolio income reflects
this priority).
77. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 193-94.
78. Cf OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital art. 10
cmt. (2008) [hereinafter OEeD Model 2008] (stating that the 15 percent treaty rate
on dividends appears to be a reasonable maximum rate given that the source country
can already tax the corporation's profits); but see ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at
184 (stating that the object of treaty provisions that limit the source country rate on
dividends seems to be keep the rate low enough so that in many cases the source tax
will not exceed the net basis tax that would be imposed in the residence country).
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5. Administrability
Administrability is an important consideration in devising source
rules. 79 Although more than one country may be connected to the derivation
of income, the current source rules usually determine a single source
apparently because of a concern that a multi-source approach would be
overly complex. 80 Source rules also attempt to avoid detailed factual
inquiries. In this regard, both the title passage rule 8l and the 50-50 source
rules used by the United States in a few contexts82 allow for bright line
determinations of source. Simplicity is especially desirable for the source
rules that are used to determine withholding obligations,83 such as those for
interest, dividends, and royalties.
C. Problems with the Current Source Rules
The current approach for sourcing income suffers from two
fundamental and related problems. First, the source rules lack coherence in
that they fail to advance a consistent normative tax policy. In particular, the
rules fail to reflect the consistent application of the key principle appropriate
for allocating nations' primary taxing rights - namely, the benefits
principle. And second, because of a lack of coherence, there may be
considerable variation in the source rules used worldwide, thus increasing the
likelihood of double taxation and non-taxation.
1. Lack of Coherence
The current sources rules employed in the United States and
elsewhere fail to advance a consistent normative tax policy.84 This leads to
79. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra
note 50, at 3-66.
80. See ALLISON CHRISTIANS, SAMUEL A. DONALDSON & PHILIP F.
POSTLEWAITE, UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 20--21 (2008).
81. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
82. See I.R.C. §§ 863(c), 863(e); Treas. Reg. § 1.863-3.
83. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3--66.
84. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 83-84
("Because no clear economic or equitable principles guide the formulation of rules to
divide income and expense by geographic origin, the construction of these rules has
been a significantly arbitrary exercise.") & n.3 ("[T]he claimed rationale for most
source rules has a substantial element of arbitrariness."); Ruth Mason, Tax
Expenditures and Global Labor Mobility, 84 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1540, 1591 (2009)
(stating that the source rules have long be criticized for their arbitrariness); Michael
J. Graetz, A Multilateral Solutionfor the Income Tax Treatment ofInterest Expenses,
62 BULL. INT'L T AX'N 486, 489 (2008) [hereinafter Graetz, Multilateral Solution]
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different sourcing approaches for economically similar types of income. 85
For example, dividends are generally sourced based on the country of
incorporation of the corporation paying the dividend. 86 In contrast, as a result
of the expected-to-tax principle,8? stock gains are generally sourced under the
U.S. rules according to the residence of the seller. 88 Yet, in substance the two
items are quite similar given that stock gains represent a market
capitalization of future earnings. 89 The different source consequences on the
sale versus license of a patent are also a result of basing source rules on
different principles. 9o Similarly, the source tax exemption that generally
applies to interest, which is to allow domestic borrowers unrestricted access
(stating that it is well known that "the 'source' of income is not well grounded
economically, nor is it conceptually straightforward," that in many instances
"archaic rules and distinctions prevail," and that it may be that the "current sourcing
rules seem arbitrary and archaic"); Edward D. Kleinbard, The Lessons of Stateless
Income 56 (USC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 11-7, 2011),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1791783 [hereinafter Kleinbard, Lessons) ("[T)he global tax
norms that define the geographic source of income or expense are largely artificial
constructs, difficult to administer and often devoid of any conceptual foundation.");
Han Benshalom, The New Poor at Our Gates: Global Justice Implications for
International Trade and Tax Law, 85 N.Y.V. L. REv. 1,76 (2010) (arguing that "the
notorious complexity of source rules is due primarily to a lack of normative
comprehension as to what they are expected to achieve"); cf Arthur J. Cockfield,
The Rise of the OECD as Informal "World Tax Organization" Through National
Responses to E-Commerce Challenges, 8 YALE J. L. & TECH. 136, 175 (2006)
(referring to observations that international tax policy suffers from a degree of
arbitrariness because of a lack of agreement on guiding principles).
85. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at n.3
(providing an example of the often capricious nature of the source rules that involves
the title passage rule for sales of inventory); cf Willard B. Taylor & Diana L.
Wollman, Why Can't We All Just Get Along: Finding Consistent Solutions to the
Treatment of Derivatives and Other Problems, 53 TAX LAW. 95, 95, 113-18 (1999)
(pointing out the differences in the source rules applying to several types of
derivative financial instruments and the lack of a seeming purpose for such;
suggesting that there could be a single rule for sourcing derivative gains and losses).
86. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
87. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
88. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text. It should be noted that
the expected-to-tax principle is problematic in some cases, in that a determination
that other countries are not imposing a source tax on a particular type of income may
not always be correct. See Andrus, supra note 42 (pointing out that the United
States' application of residence based sourcing of gains from the disposition of
foreign corporate stock pursuant to the expected-to-tax principle can result in double
taxation because a significant number of countries do tax nonresidents on such
gains).
89. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122.
90. See infra notes 105-106 and accompanying text.
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to the Eurobond market,91 is inconsistent with the general source taxation of
other types of investment income, such as dividends, rents, and royalties. 92
More fundamentally, the rules fail to reflect the consistent
application of the key principle appropriate for allocating nations' primary
taxing rights - namely, the benefits principle. As developed more fully in
the next part,93 the connection to governmental benefits should be the
guidepost for designing source of income rules, because the source rules
define the scope of source taxation and source taxation is justified by
governmental benefits provided to a nonresident by the host country. In this
regard, equity supports host country taxation of nonresidents who benefit
from host country governmental services so that the costs of these services
are not borne solely by residents of that country.
While the economic nexus principle can function to a degree as a
surrogate for focusing on governmental benefits,94 the general binary nature
of the source rules results in a failure to appropriately allocate primary tax
jurisdiction in accordance with the provision of government benefits. As
discussed above, the current source rules often assign all of the income to a
single geographic source even though relevant economic activities occur in
more than one country.95 Although administrative considerations counsel
against a sourcing approach that would take into account all countries that
might have some connection to the income,96 one certainly should question
the soundness of the current approach that usually ignores all but one of the
connected countries. Moreover, the decision to choose a particular country as
the most important either in terms of economic contribution or provision of
public benefits often is arbitrary.97 For example, where an intangible is
produced in one country and licensed for use in another country, is it so clear
that the latter country is the most important in the derivation of the income?98
91. See supra notes 21, 70-72 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 19-20, 24-27 and accompanying text.
93. See infra Part 1I1.B.1.
94. See infra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
95. See supra notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text.
97. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591 n.195 (noting different possible
bases for sourcing sales income (where title passes, place of sale, or place of
consumption) and interest income (including the residence of the borrower, where
the principal is either made available or used, or where interest payments are made»;
cf Michael J. Graetz, Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated
Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REv. 261, 317 (200 I) [hereinafter
Graetz, Inadequate Principles] (stating that the source rules "should be overhauled
to be better linked to the location of real economic activity, the location of
customers, workers, or assets").
98. Under section 861(a)(4), the royalty income will be sourced where the
intangible is being used.

Florida Tax Review

582

[Vol. 11:7

And when compared to a similar situation involving services performed in
one country that are utilized in another country, the U.S. source rules appear
inconsistent, given that the source of the service income typically will be in
the country in which the services are performed. 99 (As mentioned above,
some countries use a service destination approach for sourcing service
income. \0<)
The arbitrary and inconsistent results of single source rules are
exacerbated by the need to characterize transactions. \01 Characterization is
particularly necessary and often problematic in the case of transactions
involving intangibles and electronic commerce, where the income from a
given transaction may take the form of royalties, compensation, or property
gains based on the specific facts and circumstances. \02 And because the
single source rules produce very different results depending on the ~e of
income involved,103 a great deal turns on how income is characterized. I For
example, where a U.S. resident develops an invention in the United States,
obtains a foreign patent on the invention, and then sells the foreign patent for
a lump sum amount, all of the gain will be U.S. source;105 however, if instead
of selling the patent the taxpayer licenses the patent in exchange for a lump
sum royalty for a period that is slightly less than the patent's remaining life,
all of the income would be foreign source. 106 Despite the similarity in the
substance of these two alternatives, the source results are quite different.
2.

Variation in Source Rules Used Worldwide

Because of a lack of coherence, there may be considerable variation
in the source rules used worldwide. l07 This raises the concern of double
99. LR.C. § 861(a)(3).
100. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
101. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591 (referring to disputes about how to
classify income).
102. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 43; Andrus, supra note 42, at
855-56; David G. Noren, Commentary, The U.S. National Interest in International
Tax Policy, 54 TAX L. REv. 337, 345 (2001) (pointing out that many electronic
commerce activities can plausibly be analogized to any of these categories).
103. See supra Part ILA.
104. See Noren, supra note 102, at 345.
105. 1.R.c. §§ 865(a), 865(g)(l). This assumes that the sale was not
attributable to a foreign office maintained by the U.S. resident and subject to foreign
tax of at least ten percent. See LR.C. § 865(e){l).
106.I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(4), 862(a)(4).
107. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 14 (stating that "the rules
defining the source of income may vary considerably from country to country");
Ault &. Arnold, supra note 5, at 498-502, 506-09 (discussing differences in
countries' approaches for attributing income to domestic branches, determining the
source of employment income, and exercising source taxation over gains derived by
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taxation - that two or more countries are taxing the same income, a result
that would impede the free flow of business and investment capital. 108 Or
alternatively, differences in countries' sourcing approaches can lead to nontaxation - that no country is taxing the particular income, which may
encourage inefficient, tax-motivated transactions. 109
Where more than one country has a connection to an income item
(which is often the case), the single source approach requires that the income
be sourced to only one of the countries. In this regard, nations may come to a
different conclusion as to the appropriate country, thus creating differences
in source rules. I 10 For example, some countries source service income based
on where the services are performed, while others focus on where the
services are utilized I II or a mixture of the place of performance, the place of
contract, and place of payment. 112 Likewise, countries choose the single
source differently with respect to royalty income, with some countries using
the location of the payer or place of payment, while other countries focus on
where the intangible is being used. I I In addition, countries use substantially
nonresidents from disposing of substantial shareholdings in domestic corporations);
Technical Advisory Group on Monitoring the Application of Existing Treaty Norms
for Taxing Business Profits, DECD, Are the Current Treaty Rules for Taxing
Business Profits Appropriate for E-Commerce? Final Report 26,
http://www.oecd.orgldataoecd/58/53/35869032.pdf
[hereinafter
DECD,
ECommerce] (pointing out that even developed countries have different approaches
for determining source taxation of business profits); Dleksandr Pastukhov, Going
Where No Taxman Has Gone Before: Preliminary Conclusions and
Recommendations Drawnfrom a Decade of Debate on the International Taxation of
E-Commerce, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 1,6-7 (2009) (pointing out that
the lack of uniformity among nations in taxing electronic commerce leads to taxing
authorities being perplexed over the country that should have taxing rights).
108. See Mcintyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 1-3 to 1-4; Graetz,
Multilateral Solution, supra note 84, at 489.
109. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 1-4; Graetz, Multilateral
Solution, supra note 84, at 489.
110. See Michael J. McIntyre, The Use of Combined Reporting by NationStates, in THE TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES, ch. 8 (Brian
J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville & Eric M. Zolt, eds.) 263 (2003) ("Because the source
of income is not obvious in many cases, the source rules adopted by various
countries sometimes conflict.").
Ill. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
112. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 506-07 (discussing the Australian
approach for sourcing employment income for purposes of exercising source
taxation over nonresidents).
113. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text. While countries
generally source interest income based on the residence of the borrower (see supra
notes 17-18 and accompanying text), for purposes of its foreign tax credit limitation,
Australia sources interest that is not subject to a foreign tax based on the where the
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different approaches in attributing income to domestic branches of
nonresidents for purposes of exercising source taxation. 114 In this regard,
some countries focus on the economic connection between income items and
the branch, while other countries use "force of attraction" approaches that
attribute domestic source income to the branch regardless of an actual
economic connection, with source determined based on an independent set of
source rules. l1s The details of the approaches for sourcing branch income
tend to be relatively undeveloped - for example, the source rules are
sometimes from judge-made law that operate on a facts-and-circumstances
or similar basis. 116
Moreover, even if countries decided their single source rules in the
same way, there could still be differences in source results where countries
characterized income items differently.ll7 Assume that another country has
the same source rules as the United States with respect to service income and
royalties, but uses different rules for characterizing transactions as either the
performance of services or the licensing of an intangible. Under these
circumstances, the United States and the other country would source a given
cross-border transaction differently if the United States characterized the
transaction as the performance of services while the other country viewed it
as the licensing of an intangible.
Not surprisingly, the use of different principles for devising source
rules can lead to different source rules. For example, based on the expectedto-tax principle,118 the United States generally sources stock gains based on
the residence of the seller. 119 However, several countries impose a source tax
on gains realized by a nonresident on the sale of stock in a resident
corporation,120 presumably on the basis of the economic nexus principle. 121
funds are made available, which may be the place where the funds are advanced or
where the contract was executed. See Ault and Arnold, supra note 5, at 457.
114. See Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 498.
115. See id. at 499.
116. See id. at 500 (discussing the Australian facts-and-circumstances
approach for business income, which appears to source sales income where the
contract is made; discussing the Canadian approach under which income is treated as
domestic source if it may be allocated in a reasonable manner to a nonresident's
Canadian branch).
117. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37, n.46 (noting the problem of
conflicting characterizations of transactions by countries); ALI PROJECT II, supra
note 21, at 235 (discussing the potential for double taxation or under taxation where
countries characterize transactions differently); Andrus, supra note 42, at 856
(same).
118. See supra notes 60--63 and accompanying text.
119. See supra notes 39-40 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
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This difference in treatment can lead to double taxation where a U.S. resident
sells stock in a foreign coworation that results in a source tax in the
corporation's home country.12
In situations where countries use different domestic source rules,
bilateral income tax treaties may resolve conflicts in source rules. U.S.
treaties typically provide that for the purposes of the U.S. foreign tax credit
limitation, income that may be taxed by the other country under the treaty
will be sourced in that country.123 Sometimes treaties even provide explicit
source rules in separate articles. 124 Thus, for example, treaties may prevent
double taxation in the situation where a U.S. resident is subject to a source
tax on the sale of foreign corporate stock. 125 However, existing treaties fail to
comprehensively deal with potential conflicts in domestic source rules. In
this regard, treaties often lack specific details with regard to attributing
business profits to pennanent establishments,126 and countries may interpret
such provisions differently.127 Moreover, in limiting source taxation and
guaranteeing that countries use foreign tax credit or exemption systems,
treaties aim to avoid double taxation, and thus do not prevent the nontaxation of cross-border income that results when countries' varying source
rules create under lapping tax jurisdiction. 128 Furthennore, a bilateral treatybased solution to the problem of double taxation or non-taxation stemming
from source rule conflicts is an incomplete solution, because treaties between
countries may not always exist. 129

122. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 844.
123. See U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 23, para. 3; ALI PROJECT II,
supra note 21 at 233-34.
124. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 234.
125. See, e.g., Convention Between the U.S. and Spain for the Avoidance of
Double Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on
Income, Feb. 22, 1990, art. 13, para. 4, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-trty/spain.pdf;
Andrus, supra note 42, at 844.
126. See U.S. Model, supra note 22, at art. 7.
127. See Jessica L. Katz, Charles T. Plambeck & Diane M. Ring, Taxation
of Foreign Persons' u.s. Income, 908-2nd T.M. (BNA), at V.C.3.b(2) (stating that
most U.S. treaty partners, along with the GECD, take the position that Article 7(2) of
the GECD model treaty requires the recognition of interbranch interest expense of a
bank, whereas the United States traditionally disagreed with this interpretation of the
GECD treaty).
128. Cj Peroni, supra note 64, at 396 (pointing out that the current U.S.
source rules often allow income that is not subject to foreign taxation (for example,
by reason of a U.S. income tax treaty) to be treated as foreign source income and
thus inflate a taxpayer's foreign tax credit limitation).
129. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 844.
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EQUITy-BASED STANDARD FOR DEVISING SOURCE RULES

A. Overview, Basic Assumptions, and Preliminary Matters
To address the problems identified above, this part develops a
benefits principles-based standard for devising source rules that has the
potential to be adopted on a multilateral basis. 130 An internationally
harmonized approach to sourcing income that is based on the connection to
governmental benefits should result in a fair allocation of taxing jurisdiction
among nations; this could replace the current patchwork of rules, which often
produce incoherent and arbitrary results.13I And a principled standard that is
considered fair by a critical mass of countries could lead to internationally
harmonized source rules.132 In this regard, an important goal is that the
allocation of tax jurisdiction via source rules or their equivalent be mutually
agreeable,133 so that source taxation does not result in either double taxation
or non-taxation. 134
This Part proceeds in two steps: first by establishing the case for
using the benefits principle along with administrability as the appropriate
principles for designing source rules, and second by formulating a standard
for devising source rules that is based on the appropriate principles. Before
doing so, a few assumptions and preliminary matters are in order.
First, it is assumed that countries will continue to exercise source
taxation, as opposed to abandoning such in favor of exclusive residence
130. Cf id. at 856 (concluding that "to address the tax issues created by the
changing economy, international consensus must be developed with regard to
characterizations issues as well as source rules").
131. Cf McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66 (pointing out
that each country should receive a reasonable share of the global tax base pursuant to
a fair negotiating process).
132. See Peggy B. Musgrave, Sovereignty, Entitlement, and Cooperation in
International Taxation, 26 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 1335, 1345 (2001) (calling for the
adoption of a formula via mutual international agreement that "generally is
acceptable for reasons of fairness" in order to achieve international cooperation in
the sharing of the tax base); cf Benshalom, supra note 84, at 79 (stating that
effective tax cooperation among nations can be facilitated where "it involves an
organizing principle that all parties consider fair"); Rifat Azam, E-Commerce
Taxation and Cyberspace Law: The Integrative Adaptation Model, 12 VA. J.L. &
TECH. 5 (viewing an approach for taxing electronic commerce that divides the tax
pie fairly as having the potential to gain international acceptance).
133. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66 (stating that a
goal of model source rules should be the allocation of taxing jurisdiction in some
mutually agreeable manner); cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 856 (calling for
international consensus on source rules to address sourcing issues created by
electronic commerce and other aspects ofthe changing economy).
134. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-65 to 3-66.

20llJ

Sourcing Income Among Nations

587

taxation. Second, it is assumed that countries will continue to adhere to the
"single tax principle" - subjecting cross-border income to one tax - and
thus attempt to avoid double taxation and non-taxation by employing either
foreign tax credit or territorial systems. 135 Third, it is assumed that in
allocating taxing rights over cross-border business and investment income,
countries will continue to use the separate transactions method (source and
transfer pricing rules), rather than applying formulary apportionment
136
.
meth0 ds to a taxpayer ' s aggregate net Income.

135. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, International Taxation of Electronic
Commerce, 52 TAX L. REv. 507, 517 (1997) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Electronic
Commerce]. The single tax principle has been justified "on both theoretical and
practical grounds." Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Tax Competition, Tax Arbitrage and the
International Tax Regime, 61 BULL. INT'L TAX'N 130, 134 (2007). With regard to
theory, a heavier tax on cross-border income as compared to domestic income would
create an inefficient incentive to invest domestically; a lighter tax on cross-border
income would create an inefficient incentive to invest abroad. Id In addition, the
non-taxation of cross-border income when compared to the taxation of domestic
labor income can violate both horizontal and vertical equity. See id From a practical
perspective, double taxation of cross-border income would tend to stifle
international investment, while non-taxation of such income can lead to the
avoidance of domestic taxation by investing internationally, thereby eroding the
national tax base. Id
136. Recently, several notable commentators on international taxation have
proposed using formulary apportionment to allocate tax jurisdiction over the income
of related multi-national corporations. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A.
Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A
Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 497, 498 (2009).
While it is conceivable, it is not likely that formulary apportionment will replace the
current system in the foreseeable future. See James J. Tobin, Barbara M. Angus, &
David J. Canale, Preserving and Protecting the Arm's-Length Standard, INT'L TAX
MON., July 19,2010 (asserting that the arm's-length standard should continue to be
at the center ofthe international tax system); see also Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note
84, at 66 (pointing out that without some form of multilateral cooperation, formulary
apportionment poses a substantial risk of over or under taxation; concluding that "[i]t
is difficult to imagine how a multilateral global formulary apportionment system can
come to pass); Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, Formula Apportionment: Is It
Better Than The Current System and Are There Better Alternatives?, 63 NAT'L TAX
1. 1145, 1182-83 (2010) (concluding that formula apportionment and separate
accounts distort behavior along different margins and that simulations indicate that
the former has no clear advantages over the latter); Susan C. Morse, Revisiting
Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REv. 593 (20 10) (questioning the
benefits of the unilateral U.S. adoption of a destination sales-based formulary
apportionment method for dividing global jurisdiction to tax corporate income).
Consequently, this Article assumes the continued use of source and transfer pricing
rules to allocate taxing rights over income among nations.
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The harmonized source rules developed under the sourcing standard
should be the same for countries' taxation of both in-bound transactions by
nonresidents and out-bound transactions by residents. 137 Where countries use
uniform source rules, but the rules for in-bound and out-bound transactions
differ, either double taxation or non-taxation will result. 138 For example,
assume that all countries adopted a rule that sourced service income based on
the location of the recipient of the services for in-bound transactions and on
the place of performing services for out-bound transactions. A Country A
resident performs services in Country A for a company that is located in
Country B. Under the in-bound source rule, the Country A resident would
have Country B source income that is subject to tax in County B because the
recipient of the services was located there. However, under the out-bound
source rule, Country A would treat the income as domestic source for
purposes of calculating its resident's allowable foreign tax credit (assuming
it uses a foreign tax credit system that includes a limitation based on the
amount of foreign source income), because the services were performed in
Country A. Consequently, the Country A resident may be prohibited from
receiving a foreign tax credit against her Country A tax liability for the
Country B tax, thus potentially resulting in double taxation. If the source
rules were reversed, it could be that neither country would be taxing the
income.
Finally, the standard should be used to devise source rules that form
the basis for countries' exercise of taxing jurisdiction. 139 Thus, income that is
137. See ALI PROJECT I supra note 14, at 348-49 (stating that
"presumptively at least, the 'inbound' and 'outbound' source rules should be the
same"); PETER A. HARRIS, CORPORATE/SHAREHOLDER INCOME TAXAnON AND
ALLOCATING TAXING RIGHTS BETWEEN COUNTRIES, 445-446 (1996) (stating that
the only reference point in evaluating whether countries appropriately tax
international income "is the symmetry of their own tax system"). Some
commentators disagree with this, but they are approaching the issue of sourcing from
the perspective of enhancing the welfare of U.S. individuals. See Shay, Fleming &
Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 150-51. As mentioned above, the objective of
this Article is to develop a sourcing standard that can be adopted multilaterally,
which thus should refrain from taking into account particular countries' national
interests. See infra note 223-225 and accompanying text.
138. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 843 (source rules that do not treat U.S.
and foreign taxpayers the same will inevitably lead to double taxation or nontaxation).
139. Nevertheless, as under current law, certain countries, generally
referred to as tax havens, may impose little or no tax on income over which they
have jurisdiction to tax. Consequently, it is assumed that countries may continue to
employ mechanisms designed to prevent their residents from avoiding current taxes
on certain income that is allocated to tax haven corporations, such as the antideferral regimes used in the United States - (subpart F rules (I.R.C. §§ 951-965))
and the PFIC rules (I.R.C. §§ 1291-1298)). In addition, with the proposed sourcing
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treated as domestic source with respect to a particular country would be
subject to tax in the hands of a nonresident of that country;140 unlike current
U.S. law, 141 operative tax provisions will not prevent the taxation of income
that is treated as domestic source. Likewise, income that is treated as foreign
source would be nontaxable to a nonresident. 142 Similarly, it is contemplated
that since there will be multilateral agreement on source via harmonized
domestic rules, treaties would not generally alter the taxing rights of
countries, although treaties may still affect to some degree the tax rates that
apply to particular types of income. 143

B. Appropriate Principles for Sourcing Income
1.

The Benefits Principle

As discussed earlier,l44 the source rules are used to determine the
contours of countries' exercise of source taxation, that is, the taxation by a
host country over nonresidents. Source rules also affect the scope of
countries' exercise of residence taxation - the taxation by a country of its
residents. 145 This effect, however, is derivative of source taxation. Countries
that mitigate double taxation through foreign tax credit systems cede primary
tax jurisdiction with respect to their residents over income that is viewed as
properly subject to source taxation by host countries. Countries that use
territorial systems that exempt foreign source income cede all tax jurisdiction
over such income. Because the source rules define the scope of source
approach, countries also may want to exercise residual tax jurisdiction over the
foreign source portion of income derived by nonresidents from domestic activities.
See infra note 287 and accompanying text.
140. Cf ALI PROJECT Part I, supra note 14, at 115 (recommending that U.S.
source income generally be subject to either U.S. net basis or gross basis taxation,
although providing exceptions for certain items, including portfolio interest).
141. See, e.g., LR.C. §§ 871(h), 881(c) (portfolio interest exemption).
142. Under current U.S. law, it is possible for a foreign person to be taxable
on foreign source income. See LR.C. §§ 864(c)(4), 882(a).
143. This may be warranted in order to ameliorate the excessive burdens of
gross basis taxes where a taxpayer is likely to incur significant expenses in earning
income - for example, interest income earned by a nonresident bank. See supra
notes 73-75 and accompanying text. Of course, this could also be done through
harmonized domestic legislation, but there may be reasons why countries may find
the treaty process more appropriate for such provisions. See ALI PROJECT II, supra
note 21, at 12-13 (stating that a source country may not want to forgo taxing income
that is received by a resident of a tax haven country). With regard to the permanent
establishment requirement for subjecting business income to source taxation, it may
be advisable to retain the requirement, albeit in modified form. See infra note 342.
144. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text.
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taxation, the principles that form the basis for source taxation should be used
in formulating source rules.
It is widely accepted that source taxation is grounded on the benefits
principle: a host country should have the right to tax a nonresident on income
that benefits from host country government services, with the tax serving as a
charge, of sorts, for these benefits. l46 A nonresident with investments or
business activities in the host country benefits from numerous government
activities, including those that give rise to infrastructure (physical, economic,

146. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18; Lokken, Intellectual
Property, supra note 57 at 239; Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1,
at 90; Peggy B. Musgrave, INTERJURISDICTIONAL EQUITY IN COMPANY TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND APPLICATIONS TO THE EUROPEAN UNION, IN TAXING CAPITAL
INCOME IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 46, 52-53 (Sjibren Cnossen ed., 2000), reprinted
in Michael J. Graetz, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME TAXATION 6
(2003); Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 521; Graetz &
Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569; Michael S. Kirsch, The Role of Physical Presence in
the Taxation of Cross-Border Personal Services, 51 B.C. L. REv. 993, 1040 (2010)
[hereinafter Kirsch, Services]; Mason, supra note 84, at 1553-54; Carlo Garbarino, A
Study of the International Tax Policy Process: Defining the Rules for Sourcing
Income from Isolated Sales of Goods, 29 HARv. INT'L LJ. 393,394 (1988); William
B. Barker, An International Tax System for Emerging Economies, Tax Sparing, and
Development: It Is All About Source!, 29 U. PA. J. INT'L L. 349, 369-70 (2007);
Benshalom, supra note 84, at 75; Steven A. Dean, More Cooperation, Less
Uniformity: Tax Deharmonization and the Future of the International Tax Regime,
84 TUL. L. REv. 125, 161 & n.163 (2009) (referring to the benefits principle, used to
assign tax jurisdiction, as being in some respects ''the cornerstone of the modern
income tax regime"); Kim Brooks, Inter-Nation Equity: The Development of an
Important but Underappreciated International Tax Policy Objective, in TAX
REFORM IN THE 21ST CENTURY 471, 492 (John G. Head & Richard Krever, eds.,
2009); Lokken, Source, supra note 49 at 3; Jeffrey M. Colon, Financial Products
and Source Basis Taxation: U.S. International Tax Policy at the Crossroads, 1999
U. ILL. L. REv. 775, 781; Edward A. Zelinsky, Citizenship and Worldwide Taxation:
Citizenship as an Administrable Proxy for Domicile, 96 IOWA L. REv. 1289, 129394 (2011) (viewing source taxation as justified by the benefits principle on a
theoretical level); cf OECD, E-Commerce supra note 107, at 12, (referring to the
benefits principle as a justification for source taxation; stating that source taxation
may also serve to prevent nonresidents from capturing all of the economic rent
derived from exploiting the host country's resources); Mitchell A. Kane, Risk and
Redistribution in Open and Closed Economies, 92 VA. L. REv. 867, 904-05 (2006)
(stating that source taxation is typically grounded either upon the benefits principle
or a theory of economic rents). For a recent discussion of the benefits principle for
taxation in general, see James R. Repetti, Democracy and Opportunity: A New
Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 V AND. L. REv. 1129, 1135-38 (2008).
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and legal), public safety, national security, and a skilled workforce. 147
Consequently, a key principle in detennining whether an item of income
should be sourced to a particular country is whether that country provides the
taxpayer with governmental benefits that relate to the income. 148
Closely aligned with the benefits principle basis for sourcing is the
view that income should be sourced according to the location of the
economic activities that give rise to the income. 149 The economic nexus basis
for sourcing is best understood as a surrogate for the benefits principle that is, the location of economic activities is where the taxpayer receives
government benefits that justify a source tax. 150 Indeed, authorities referring
to the economic nexus basis for sourcing income usually also refer to the
place of legal protections as a basis for sourcing,ISI thus suggesting that it is
the connection to government benefits that underlies the focus on economic
activities. Importantly, economic nexus is an incomplete surrogate for the
benefits principle in that by focusing on the location of economic activities
conducted by taxpayer, it ignores government benefits provided by the
taxpayer's country of residence that relate to the earning and enjoyment of
income by the taxpayer. 152
147. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90;
Mason, supra note 84, at 1553-54. For a more detailed discussion of these public
benefits, see infra Part III.C.I.
148. See Col6n, supra note 146, at 781 ("A designation of an item of
income as U.S. (or foreign) source indicates that the United States (or a foreign
country) is the country that has provided the primary benefits resulting in the earning
of such income and therefore has primary tax jurisdiction."); Lokken, Source, supra
note 49 at 3-4 (proposing a conceptual framework for source determinations that
"apportions a taxpayer's ability to pay among jurisdictions in a way that reflects the
governmental services and protections available to the taxpayer in profit-seeking
activities"); cf DECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 14 n.20 (noting that the
benefits principle, which provides a justification for source taxation, "can also be put
forward as a principle for determining the source of the business profits").
149. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
150. See Dean, supra note 146, at 162 & n.l64 (indicating that the benefits
principle underlies the recognized right of a country to tax income derived from
economic activity occurring within its borders).
151. See TREASURY II, supra note 50, at 399.
152. Cf Dean, supra note 146, at 161 n.162 (stating that the benefits
principle also describes the relationship between a country and its residents and
citing PEGGIE BREWER RICHMAN, TAXATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 23 (1963) for the proposition that a country has the right to tax
the income and wealth of its residents based on the protection and servl\;es provided
by the country). These residence country benefits are more fully described below.
See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text. It should be noted that Professor
Lokken, in proposing a conceptual framework for source determinations that relies
on the benefits principle, would not take into account consumer benefits received by
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Source taxation may also be justified by the right of a host country to
exact a charge for economic rents, or super-normal returns, realized by
nonresidents through the use of a country's resources.153 This basis for
source taxation, however, should properly be viewed as merely a supplement
to the benefits principle basis, as it would only permit a host country to tax
super-normal returns. In both theory and practice, it is widely acknowledged
that source taxation extends to all income that bears a sufficient economic
connection to the host country, not just super-normal returns. 154
At its core, the benefits principle underlying source taxation is an
equitable principle. Nonresidents who earn income that profits from a
country's government activities should be subject to source taxation on such
income; otherwise, the burden for these government activities that benefit

individuals that do not directly relate to the production of income. See Lokken,
Source, supra note 49 at 3.
153. See OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 12; Robert A. Green, The
Future of Sourced-Based Taxation of the Income of Multinational Enterprises, 79
CORNELL L. REv. 18,30 (1993); Charles E. McLure, Jr., Substituting ConsumptionBased Direct Taxationfor Income Taxes as the International Norm, 45 NAT'L TAXJ.
145, 148 (1992); Kane, supra note 140, at 904-05.
154. See Green, supra note 153, at 30 (stating that this argument does not
justify source-based corporate income taxes); but see McLure, supra note 153, at
149 (considering the adoption of consumption-based direct taxation as the
international norm, the effect of which would be source taxation of only economic
rents for the most part). The power of governments to impose source taxes, or force
majeure, is another explanation given for source taxation. See Green, supra note, 153
at 31-32. Even if force majeure were an explanation, it would apparently not provide
a principle for designing source rules suitable for worldwide adoption. One
commentator has offered a pragmatic justification for source taxation - that the
source country is generally in the best position to enforce a tax on cross-border
income. See id. Arguably, this possible justification for source taxation could
provide a basis for designing sources rules, under which income could be sourced to
the country that is able to monitor transnational income by requiring local firms and
financial intermediaries to report and withhold on payments they make to
nonresidents. However, basing source taxation and implementing source rules on a
country's enforcement capabilities appears to go too far, in that tax collection can be
protected even without source taxation of cross-border income by requiring the
country in the better position to monitor cross-border income to report such income
to the recipient's country of residence or to withhold tax subject to refunds upon
demonstration that a residence country tax has been paid. Cf GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
68-71 (1992) (recommending similar measures for a system that imposes residenceonly taxation of portfolio income). Consequently, countries' enforcement
capabilities should not provide the primary basis for designing multilateral source
rules, although enforcement concerns should be a factor is formulating particular
source rules. See infra Part III.C.3.b for a discussion of this latter point.
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nonresidents would be borne by residents of that country alone. ISS Thus, an
equitable sharing of the cost of government activities between nonresidents
and residents is at the root of source taxation.
The equity basis underlying source taxation can be described as a
form of inter-individual equity, because it requires the fair treatment of
taxpayers - residents and nonresidents - who receive governmental
benefits from a particular country.IS6 It can also be described as inter-nation
equity, a term that usually refers to the equitable sharing among nations of
the taxation of cross-border business and investment income. 157 In any event,
the normative basis for inter-nation equity, if any, would appear to rest on
the theoretical foundation for inter-individual equity, since it is individuals
that ultimately pay taxes. IS8

155. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 96-97
("Domestic fairness requires that the costs of the U.S. government be borne both by
(I) residents on the basis of ability to pay, and (2) nonresidents on the basis of an
appropriate charge for the privilege of exploiting the U.S. market. To the extent that
abandonment of source taxation relieves nonresidents of their charge, the tax burden
belonging to nonresidents inevitably will shift to U.S. residents. A failure of
nonresidents to contribute to the costs of government, would therefore, diminish, not
enhance, domestic tax fairness."); See Nancy H. Kaufman, Fairness and the
Taxation of International Income, 29 LAW & POL'y INT'L Bus. 145, 153 (1998)
(referring to the conclusion of other commentators that under the benefit theory for
source taxation "individuals who benefit equally from government, including
nonresidents, should contribute to the host country's cost of government").
156. See Kaufman, supra note 155 at 153 (stating that most scholarship on
residence and source taxation internationalizes inter-individual equity).
157. See id at 153-54 (citing to writings by Peggy Musgrave and Richard
Musgrave describing inter-nation equity in various ways: "an 'equitable
international distribution of the tax base, '" '''an equitable division of the tax revenue
between countries,'" "an equitable 'allocation of national gain and loss,'" '''[t]he
problem of tax shares in international business, '" and "an equitable division of the
'tax pie ... among the treasuries of the various countries"').
158. In examining whether tax competition among nations should be
reconsidered in order to promote inter-nation equity, Professor Ring evaluated the
normative basis for inter-nation equity in terms of inter-individual equity ("because
it is the individuals for whom we are ultimately concerned") and concluded that "to
fit inter-nation equity into the current framework of inter-individual equity
(premised on a legitimate nation-state and community) we can only endorse the
'inter-nation version' of inter-individual equity ifin fact all of these individuals are
members of a single community under one government - a global state." Diane
Ring, Democracy, Sovereignty and Tax Competition: The Role of Tax Sovereignty in
Shaping Tax Cooperation, 9 FLA. TAX REv. 555, 587 (2009). Professor Ring does
leave open the possibility in the future for a normative basis for inter-nation equity
standing alone, based on an accepted theory of duty and obligations owed to others
globally. See id at 585, 587, 590.
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The equity basis for source taxation may be complicated by the fact
that some residents of a given country will be investing or doing business in
other countries. Thus, it may be contended that one country's failure to tax a
nonresident for the receipt of governmental benefits can be "offset" by the
failure of the nonresident's country to tax the other country's residents when
they receive host country governmental benefits. One response is that
taxpayers with purely domestic business and investment activities would not
benefit from another country's lack of source taxation: such taxpayers would
bear the cost of home country governmental benefits received by
nonresidents but would not take advantage of tax-free governmental benefits
provided by other countries. Nonetheless, a further contention may be that
resident taxpayers with purely domestic activities would not suffer from their
home country's lack of source taxation over nonresidents because other
home country residents with foreign income that is free of source taxation
would then bear a greater residence country tax burden. This is because
without the imposition of source taxation, there would be no occasion nor
need for a home country to provide its residents with foreign tax credits or
foreign income exclusions, respectively.159 Thus, a home country would be
taxing its residents with foreign income effectively as surrogates for the
nonresidents receiving governmental benefits from the particular country.
However, this argument assumes equal capital flows between countries,
which would never be the case. If a given country's amount of nonresident
investment or business activity exceeds the amount of foreign investment or
business activity conducted by its residents, i.e., is a net capital importer,
then its residents with purely domestic activities would not experience a
sufficient tax offset for its country's failure to exercise source taxation over
nonresidents.
Notions of perceived equity bolster the equity basis for source
taxation. Recently, some leading commentators on international taxation
have put forth what they term as a new principle for structuring source
taxation - the parity principle. 160 In applying this principle to U.S. source
taxation, they assert that the U.S. income tax should treat businesses owned
by foreign taxpayers no more favorably than comparably situated U.S.owned businesses. 161 The basis for the parity principle is that residence
taxation will lose legitimacy and efficacy if residents perceive that they are
being more heavily taxed than nonresidents with equal amounts of income

159. See Green, supra note 153, at 80 (pointing out that with international
agreement on a residence-based tax system, the United States would collect more
tax revenue from its residents with foreign source income because it would no longer
yield to other countries the primary right to tax such income).
160. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 110-11.
161. Id. at 111.
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from the residence country; 162 thus, this principle rests on perceptional equity
concerns (along with real equity concerns).163 In applying the parity principle
in examining a few source rules, the commentators refer to the access to the
U.S. market, which they see as a product of government activities, as well as
U.S. legal protections/ 64 indicating that the benefits principle is at the core of
their parity principle. Consequently, their work suggests that both real and
perceptional equity concerns support the benefits-principle basis for source
taxation.

2. Effect of the Ability to Pay Principle
In contrast to source taxation, residence taxation rests on a different
equity basis than source taxation, this being the notion of a taxpayer's ability
to pay.165 Under residence taxation, the tax burden is allocated among
taxpayers in a manner that reflects their relative abilities to pay.166 Because a
taxpayer's worldwide income is usually considered the proper gauge for
measuring a taxpayer's ability to pay, and because the ability to pay principle
suggests that tax rates should be progressive, residence taxation is generally
implemented by imposing a progressive tax on a taxpayer's worldwide
income. 167
Although it may seem as though source taxation and residence
taxation are quite distinct, this is not the case. First, source taxation, while
founded on the benefits principle, can be viewed as having ability-to-pay
attributes. 168 The source tax, similar to the residence tax, is determined by
applying tax rates to a nonresident's domestic source income. Thus, no effort
is made to approximate the value of the benefits received by the nonresident
from the host country's government activities that relate to the nonresident's
income, no doubt because it would be impossible to do so with any degree of

162. See id.
163. Other scholars have pointed out the importance of perceptional equity.
See, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REv. 319, 368-69 (1993).
164. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91-92,
142-43.
165. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr., Robert J. Peroni & Stephen E. Shay,
Fairness in International Taxation: The Ability-to-Pay Case for Taxing Worldwide
Income,5 FLA. TAX REv. 299, 306-08 (2001) [hereinafter Fleming, Peroni & Shay,
Fairness). Besides equity, other considerations that are important in residence
taxation include economic efficiency and administrability. See id. at 306-08 & n.14.
166. See Green, supra note 153, at 29.
167. See id.
168. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40.
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accuracy.169 Instead, the amount of tax that is imposed on a nonresident's
domestic source income appears to reflect the host country's determination
of a fair allocation of the tax burden based on the relative abilities to pay of
all taxpayers, with nonresidents judged only on the basis of their domestic
source income. l7o This view is buttressed by the fact that the rates that apply
to a nonresident's domestic source business income are often progressive in
nature.17I Thus, while the benefits principle forms the basis for, and defines
the scope of, source taxation, the ability to pay principle appears to provide
some role, at least in practice, in determining the amount of tax that is
imposed on a nonresident's domestic source income. 172
In addition, and of significance in determining principles for
sourcing income, source taxation and residence taxation are related in that
source taxation frustrates to an extent the ability to pay principle underlying
residence taxation. It is standard practice, as well as an assumption of this
Article, 173 that with source taxation, countries will relieve international
double taxation either by allowing their residents a foreign tax credit or
exempting certain foreign income from residence taxation. Where a foreign
tax credit is allowed, the residence tax is reduced by the amount of the credit,
whereas from the strict standpoint of measuring ability to pay, there should
only be a deduction for foreign taxes, as is the case with other expenses of
earning income.174 And where a residence country employs an exemption
system to relieve double taxation, the residence country ignores completely
the exempt foreign income in measuring the resident's ability to pay.
Consequently, source taxation effectively diminishes the ability of a
169. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1585 (stating that it would be impossible
to determine precisely the amount of government benefits received by taxpayers);
Barker, supra note 146, at 370 (stating that there is no way to measure directly the
benefit received; instead one should develop a tax base that reflects the benefit
received).
170. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40.
171. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882(a).
172. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239-40. Whether
this is correct as a normative matter is another issue. Some commentators are of the
view that ability-to-pay considerations should not be used in connection with source
taxation. Their reason is that ability to pay should be measured by reference to a
taxpayer's total income and not just that income over which a country exercises
taxing jurisdiction. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 9495. Nevertheless, these commentators endorse the determination of a nonresident's
source tax liability by imposing graduated tax rates on a nonresident's domestic
source, because it is a reasonable and practical measure of the host country
government benefits received and it treats nonresidents in a nondiscriminatory
manner versus residents. See id. at 95, 104.
173. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
174. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at 328; Ault &
Bradford, supra note 1, at 41.
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residence country to equitably allocate the costs of government activities
among its residents on their respective abilities to pay. 175
Based on this reason, some commentators call for an end to source
taxation in favor of exclusive residence taxation.176 Other commentators
advocate for a modified source taxation approach under which passive
income would be subject to exclusive residence taxation, but active income
would continue to be subject to source taxation.177 Those supporting the
modified source taxation approach justify the passive/active income
distinction by pointing to the fact that international passive income is often
earned by individuals, for whom ability to pay taxation is geared, whereas
international active income tends to be earned by corporations, for which the
ability to pay principle is less relevant. 178 Because these proposals call for a
reduction (or even elimination) of source taxation, they would obviously
greatly affect the formulation of source rules.
The appropriateness of eliminating or reducing source taxation
should be decided on the basis of the equitable principles involved. Source
taxation promotes an equitable sharing of the costs of government among
residents and nonresidents. Residence taxation advances the equitable
allocation of the costs of government among residents based on their relative
abilities to pay. Because source taxation frustrates residence taxation to an
extent, the issue is which approach strikes the appropriate balance between
these two competing types of equity.
Exclusive residence taxation simply goes too far in favor of abilityto-pay equity, by ignoring completely the benefits provided to nonresidents
by the host country. I79 In addition, because exclusive residence taxation
would result in more tax revenue for developed countries and less for
175. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 97. Some
commentators appear to take the position that source taxation is objectionable under
the ability-to-pay criterion not necessarily because it interferes with residence
taxation, but because source taxation is itself a poor way to measure ability to pay as
it only taxes a portion of a taxpayer's worldwide income and sometimes uses gross
basis withholding taxes. See Graetz and Grinberg, supra note 76, at 570; Green,
supra note 153, at 29.
176. See Green, supra note 153, at 29, 32.
177. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REv. 1301 (1996) [hereinafter Avi-Yonah,
Simplification] .
178. See id. at 1310--17.
179. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME
TAXATION 67-68 (2003) [hereinafter Graetz, FOUNDATIONS]; cf Avi-Yonah,
Simplification, supra note 177 at 1311 (stating that the ability-to-pay argument for
exclusive residence taxation does not explain why the home country should have the
only claim to tax cross-border income and that based on economic allegiance, both
countries should have taxing rights).
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developing countries, the latter would likely refuse to cooperate in such a
system. 180 In any event, this Article assumes that countries will continue to
exercise source taxation. 181
While an approach that eliminates source taxation of passive income
at least strikes a balance between the equitable principles involved, is it an
appropriate one? Equitable determinations are fraught with value
judgments,182 and the same is true in deciding between competing notions of
equity. There appears to be no correct answer here. The remainder of the
Article assumes that countries will generally agree that the equitable notions
underlying the benefits principle are more important than those supporting
ability-to-pay taxation where these equitable notions conflict, and that the
benefits principle should generally dictate the scope of source taxation for
both passive and active income. However, under the proposed sourcing
standard (which is discussed in the next section I83 ), it would be possible to
take ability-to-pay equity into account to some extent in determining the
source of income;184 this can be done by increasing the portion of income
that is sourced to the country of residence due to ability-to-pay equity
considerations. 18s

3. Administrability
Another principle that should guide the development of a sourcing
standard is administrability.186 It is important for source rules to operate in a
clear fashion and refrain from requiring difficult factual determinations on a
case-by-case basis. 187 Both taxpayers and tax administrators need clarity and
180. See Avi-Yonah, Simplification, supra note 177 at 1313-14.
181. See supra text accompanying note 135.
182. Indeed, some would assert that for purposes of the ability-to-pay
criterion, a resident of a country who has income from foreign sources is not
similarly situated to a resident with income only from domestic sources. See Ault &
Bradford, supra note 1, at 41 (referring to these assertions).
183. See infra Part IIl.e.
184. Cj Julie Roin, Competition and Evasion: Another Perspective on
International Tax Competition, 89 GEO. L.J. 543, 588-89 (2001) (in arguing for a
system where the United States exempts foreign income from taxation, contending
that the United States may be justified in imposing some tax on such income because
of the government benefits provided by the United States to U.S. corporations with
respect to such income, along with the notion that "U.S. corporations may be
expected to contribute to the redistributional social benefits decided upon by the
nation's electorate").
185. See infra note 312 and accompanying text.
186. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 19; TREASURY II, supra note 50,
at 399; McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-66 to 3-67.
187. TREASURY II, supra note 50, at 399; see McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra
note 50, at 3-66; Andrus, supra note 42, at 842.
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minimal uncertainty in performing their respective compliance and
enforcement tasks. This is particularly so where the source of income
determines whether a payer of an item is required to withhold in order to
collect tax on an in-bound transaction. 188
To this end, the sourcing standard, and the rules devised thereunder,
should avoid overly refined approaches aimed at absolute precision. In
particular, while the sourcing standard (discussed in the next section) will
call for the division of an item of income among different sources where
appropriate,189 this will generally be done using a bright line approach in
order to provide clear and predictable source rules. 190 Such an approach is
further supported by the equity basis that underlies the benefits principle,
which, as noted above, is somewhat imprecise given the value judgments
involved. 191
An aspect of administrability is that a source tax must be
enforceable. 192 It would make little sense in designating income as domestic
source for purposes of a country's exercise of source taxation over
nonresidents if the tax cannot be enforced because the nonresidents are not
physically present in the host country and collection of the tax through
withholding would not be feasible. Accordingly, enforcement should be an
important consideration under the standard for devising source rules. 193
4. Inappropriate Principles in Developing the Sourcing Standard

The preceding subsections have determined that connection to
government benefits and administrability are principles that should guide the
development of a standard for sourcing income. This subsection
demonstrates why other principles should not be used in developing the
sourcing standard, because they either do not appropriately relate to sourcing
income or are not suitable for crafting source rules intended for multilateral
adoption. 194
188. See McIntyre, Tax Rules, supra note 50, at 3-66; cf ALI PROJECT I,
supra note 14, at 36 (referring to withholding complications as a reason for not
dividing the source of rental income where a taxpayer had produced the leased
property).
189. See infra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
190. Cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 842 (noting the administrative benefits of
source rules that rely on line drawing).
191. See supra notes 155-56, 182 and accompanying text.
192. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 115.
193. See Walker, supra note 47, at 6,30.
194. In this regard, the principles underlying treaty provisions that reduce or
eliminate source taxation on investment income can be viewed as either consistent
with, or supplemental to, an approach for sourcing income that focuses on the
countries that provide the taxpayer with public benefits relating to the income. To
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Capital Export Neutrality and Capital Import Neutrality

Capital export neutrality (CEN) and capital import neutrality (CrN)
should be examined for their potential for providing principles for sourcing.
While these are the key neutrality £olicies generally thought to govern the
structure of cross-border taxation, 1 5 they apparently have little to offer in
developing the sourcing standard. 196
CEN is satisfied when a resident pays the same total of resident
country and foreign taxes regardless of whether the income is earned within
or without the country of residence. 197 In this situation, a resident's decision
to invest in the residence country or abroad is unaffected by the tax
consequences in the residence and foreign countries. 198 Instead, the decision
is dictated by pre-tax returns. 199 Because the location of investments is not
affected by the income taxes, economists generally view CEN as essential
for worldwide economic efficiency.2oo
Whether CEN is achieved does not depend on the method used for
dividing tax jurisdiction among countries. For example, CEN would be
satisfied if all countries used residence taxation exc1usively.201 Alternatively,
CEN would exist with source taxation, provided that residence countries
taxed domestic and foreign income the same and allowed for an unlimited
and refundable foreign tax credit. 202 (It should be noted that apparently no
the extent that these· treaty provisions reflect the view that the source country's claim
to tax investment income is relatively weak (see supra notes 76-78 and
accompanying text), they are conceptually consistent with the benefits principle;
nevertheless, an evaluation of the related public benefits under the standard proposed
in this Article may lead to different allocations of tax jurisdiction than that currently
provided in treaties. To the extent that the treaty limitations on taxing investment
income aim to prevent excessive source taxation, this principle can co-exist with
harmonized source rules founded primarily on the benefits principle, by allowing for
treaties to continue reducing the source tax rate on certain income where appropriate
to achieve this objective. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
195. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 270-71.
196. See GECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 13 (concluding that the
policies of CEN or CIN do not depend in practice on whether a country should have
source taxation rights over particular income); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source
Rules, supra note 1, at 108-10 (stating that CEN and CIN apply without regard to
the division of tax revenue between source and residence countries; concluding that
the efficiency criterion offer little help in the design of source taxation).
197. See CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON, ROBERT J. PERONI & RICHARD
eRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 20 (2011).
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 270.
201. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 108.
202. See id.
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country allows for an unlimited foreign tax credii03). On the other hand,
CEN is not satisfied where a residence country uses a territorial system that
exempts foreign income (assuming that foreign tax rate differs from the rate
applied by the residence country on domestic source income), and this would
be true regardless of how income is sourced for these purposes. Thus, with
source taxation, whether or not CEN is satisfied depends primarily on
methods used by resident countries for mitigating double taxation. 204
Nevertheless, CEN does support measures to reduce opportunities for crosscrediting, so that taxpayers will not have a tax incentive to invest in activities
generating low-taxed foreign income as opposed to domestic income. 205 And,
as discussed above/06 a way of combating cross-crediting is to treat income
as domestic source where a foreign country is not expected to tax the
income. However, as pointed out below/07 this expected-to-tax principle is
not relevant in designing source rules intended for multilateral adoption by
countries. 208
CIN exists when the total tax that is paid on income earned in a
country is determined without regard to the residence of the taxpayer?09
Thus, CIN requires that all firms operating in a particular country be taxed at
the same rate, whether the firms are domestically or foreign owned.2IO Where
CIN holds, the worldwide allocation of savings is efficient because all savers
receive the same after-tax returns. 2lI
Upon initial examination, it would seem that similar to CEN, CIN is
concerned only with the overall structure of international taxation. Thus, it is
often stated that CIN would exist where countries employed territorial tax
regimes that exempted foreign source income.212 Under such a structure, only
the source country would be taxing income from activities or investments
within a given country, thus resulting in the same level of taxation for all
taxpayers with income from that country.
On closer inspection, however, CIN does have something to say
about the design of source rules. For CIN to exist, source countries and
residence countries must apply the same source rules in determining the
203. See id; Graetz, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 179, at 27.
204. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note I, at 109.
205. See Graetz, Inadequate PrinCiples, supra note 97, at 271.
206. See supra notes 6~3 and accompanying text.
207. See infra Part III.B.4.b.
208. Moreover, cross-crediting can also be addressed by having separate
foreign tax credit limitations for different categories of foreign source income, as
contained in section 904(d). See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 41323.
209. See id. at 21.
210. See id.
211. See Graetz, Inadequate PrinCiples, supra note 97, at 271.
212. See id.
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income to tax and exempt, respectively. Moreover, even with the uniform
source rules, CIN would be violated if residence-based source rules were
used. For example, assume that all countries sourced income from electronic
commerce according to the residence of the taxpayer rather than the location
of the sales activity or the destination ofthe items sold. Under this rule, sales
by e-commerce sellers would be treated as domestic source for purposes of
residence country taxation and exempt income for purposes of source
taxation. Further assume that Country A imposes a 40 percent tax, Country B
imposes a 30 percent tax, and Country C imposes a 20 percent tax. In these
circumstances, a resident of Country C who is selling goods electronically
into Country C would be taxed at 20 percent (the Country C rate), whereas a
Country B resident performing the same activity would be taxed at 30
percent (the Country B rate). Assume that for both sellers all activities
related to these electronic sales (such as maintaining a web site) occur in
Country A. Thus, CIN is violated because the two sellers are not subject to
the same tax on income that is earned through performing electronic sales
activities in Country A and accessing the Country C market. 213
Consequently, CIN dictates that residence-based methods not be used to
source income. However, as to whether the income should be sourced
according to the location of the seller's activities or the location of the
market (or a combination of both), CIN provides no guidance: as long as all
countries apply the same source rule, taxpayers resident in different countries
will be subject to the same rate of taxation with respect to operations in the
same country or countries.
While CIN does provide some guidance for designing source rules,
CIN is not the generally accepted neutrality standard214 and consequently
does not seem to be an appropriate guide for crafting source rules intended
for multilateral adoption by countries.215 Economists generally favor CEN
over CIN because distortions in the investment locations are considered to be
more costly than distortions in the savings allocation216 (and it is practically
213. See infra note 244-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of
sourcing income based on accessing a country's market.
214. See Jane G. Gravelle, Congo Research Serv., Reform of u.s.
International Taxation: Alternatives 7 (2010) (concluding that "capital import
'neutrality' is not neutral at all").
215. Moreover, commentators have asserted that CIN has little or no
relevance to the taxation of portfolio income, because taxing such income has no
effect on the abilities of companies from different nations to compete against one
another in a particular country. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 558-59.
216. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 272. Moreover, as
a practical matter, CIN is often rejected as an objective compared to CEN and
national neutrality, given that many national policies of individual countries affect
the return to savings. See James R. Hines, Jr., Reconsidering the Taxation ofForeign
Income, 62 TAX L. REv. 269, 273-74 (2009). Nevertheless, economists may still
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impossible to achieve CEN and CIN simultaneously).2I7 Consequently, it is
unlikely that countries would generally agree to adhere to CIN, which would
be necessary for them to want to use it as a principle for designing source
rules. For these reasons, CIN should not inform the development of the
sourcing standard. 218

advocate territorial taxation based on a "second best" efficiency argument, as well as
asserted simplicity and revenue raising benefits. See Gravelle, supra note 214, at 1314 (referring to proposals advancing these arguments, but not subscribing to such
views).
217. To do so would require uniform income tax bases and tax rates for all
countries, or a worldwide government. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra
note 97, at 272.
218. Capital ownership neutrality (CON), a relatively recent neutrality
policy, should also be considered for providing principles for developing the
sourcing standard. CON requires that international tax rules not distort the identities
of the owners of capital. See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22 (citing
to Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines, Jr., Evaluating International Tax Reform, 56
NAT'L TAX J. 487 (2003)). According to its proponents, CON can be achieved if all
countries adopted territorial tax systems. See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 8
& n.4; Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22. Alternatively, CON can be
met if all countries adopted worldwide tax systems with foreign tax mechanisms.
See Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 8 n.4; Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra
note 197, at 22. In short, CON calls for conformity among countries in the method of
double tax relief. See Gustafson, Peroni & Pugh, supra note 197, at 22; cf. Mitchell
A. Kane, Ownership Neutrality, Ownership Distortion, and International Tax
Welfare Benchmarks, 26 Va. Tax Rev. 53, 73-78 (2006) [hereinafter Kane,
Ownership ] (characterizing the prescription of CON in this fashion but not agreeing
that non-mixed systems for providing double tax relief necessarily result in
ownership efficiency). CON would appear to offer no principles for the design of
multilateral source rules for use in either worldwide or territorial tax systems. This is
because with worldwide tax systems coupled with foreign tax credit mechanisms,
CON should be satisfied regardless of particular source rules. With territorial tax
systems, CON should be satisfied as long as countries use uniform source rules.
And, unlike the case for achieving CIN, it should not matter that such source rules
employ residence-based sourcing approaches, as the key in achieving CON is the
global consensus in the form of double tax relief Moreover, even if CON did
provide principles for developing multilateral source rules, like CIN, CON does not
appear to be the generally accepted neutrality standard. See Gravelle, supra note 214,
at 10 ("In light of the many ways in which the efficiency costs of capital ownership
non-neutrality are unlikely to be significant compared to location distortions, it
seems questionable to use meeting this standard of neutrality to evaluate tax reform
changes."); Kane, Ownership, supra, at 56 (arguing that CON is not an appropriate
benchmark for determining international tax policy given the many factors that
distort ownership patterns).

604

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 11:7

b. Expectation that Another Country Will Be Taxing the
Income
As mentioned previously, another principle that is sometimes used to
source income is whether it is expected that other countries will be taxing the
income.219 The concern underlying this principle is international under
taxation. That is, if income is included in calculating a residence country's
foreign tax credit limitation, but the income is not taxed by another country,
the taxpayer would be able to cross-credit excess foreign tax credits on other
foreign income against the pre-credit residence country tax on the income,
thus effectively resulting in no or reduced overall tax on the income?20
Similarly, if the residence country uses a territorial system, exempting
income that is not taxed by another country would mean that no country is
taxing the income.
The expected-to-tax principle is simply not relevant to the design of
sourc.e rules in light of the following objectives of this Article - that the
sourcing standard should produce source rules that are the same for
countries' taxation of both in-bound transactions by nonresidents and outbound transactions by residents, and that the source rules fonn the basis for
countries' exercise of taxing jurisdiction. With the same source rules being
applied by countries for taxing inbound and outbound transactions, the
concern that underlies the expected-to-tax principle should not be present:
income that is treated as foreign source for purposes of a taxpayer's home
country foreign
credit will be treated as domestic source and thereby be
taxable by the host country.221 Consequently, the expected-to-tax principle
should be discarded in the design of multilateral source rules. 222

tar-

c.

National Interests

Finally, the national interests of particular countries should not be
considered as relevant factors in developing the sourcing standard. In this
219. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
220. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
221. Of course, even with the general adoption of the sourcing scheme
proposed by this Article, there will always be outlier countries. However, assuming
that they are in the distinct minority, then in the vast majority of cases the concern
underlying the expected-to-tax principle would not be present (because the vast
majority of countries will be using consistent rules), and thus this principle need not
be used in formulating source rules. If the proposed sourcing approach is not
generally adopted, then it should not be used because of the high degree of double
taxation and non-taxation that is likely to result. See infra notes 333-35 and
accompanying text.
222. See supra note 88 for problems under current law with source rules
based on this principle.
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regard, some prominent commentators assert that U.S. national interests
should dictate the structure of U.S. international income tax rules.223
Fostering national interests may be a proper consideration in contexts where
it is not critical whether countries use harmonized approaches for taxing
international income. For example, it would appear that no great harm results
where some countries tax their residents on the basis of worldwide income
subject to the allowance of foreign tax credits, while other countries employ
exemptions systems under which certain foreign income is excluded from
home country taxation. Consequently, in deciding among these overall
structures for taxing international income, it would appear that countries may
appropriately take into account national concerns such as the economic wellbeing of their own residents. However, where source rules vary among
countries, there is the potential for double or under taxation. For this reason,
this Article seeks to develop rules that are suitable for international
acceptance,224 and universal agreement wi11likely not be reached on source
rules that are designed to serve the national interests of one or more
nations. 225
Accordingly, source rules suitable for multilateral adoption should
avoid features aimed at Eromoting national interests, such as the title passage
rule for inventory sales 26 and the portfolio interest exemption.227 It may be
223. See Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 277-82 (framing
the inquiry as what international income tax rules will enhance the economic wellbeing of u.s. citizens and residents); Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 538
(asking what income tax policy for taxing foreign portfolio investments serves the
United States' interest); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 9798 (in evaluating the structure of U.S. source taxation, asserting that "the primary
obligation of U.S. tax policy is to improve the well-being ... of U.S. individuals").
224. See Musgrave, supra note 132, at 1344 (calling for cooperative rules
among nations for the division of the tax base and tax rates); OECD, E-Commerce,
supra note 107, at 25 (stressing the need for universal agreement of rules for
allocating taxing rights over business profits in order to prevent double taxation or
non-taxation).
225. Cf Musgrave, supra note 132, at 1348 (noting that the national
interests of countries may conflict with each other).
226. See supra note 32 and accompanying text. In this regard,
commentators assert that the foreign tax credit and the source rules used for purposes
of limiting the credit should be focused on mitigating the double taxation of foreign
income and "should not be designed to subsidize foreign investment, favor or
disfavor particular types of investment, or serve nonrevenue raising foreign policy
objectives." See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 149.
Commentators have used tax expenditure analysis to demonstrate that the title
passage rule as applied to U.S. export sales is an inappropriate and ineffective
subsidy for such sales activities; these commentators accordingly recommend that
the title passage rule for export sales be repealed, and that the source of income from
export sales be determined using an approach that more clearly reflects the location
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contended that such deviations from the benefits principle whereby countries
give up tax revenue228 in order to promote national interests are benign from
the standpoint of achieving universal agreement: countries not employing
such features may simply not care because the effect would be undertaxation borne by another country as opposed to potential double taxation of
a country's residents. However, other countries may object because such
measures may harm their own national interests - for example, the title
passage rule may provide a U.s. exporter with a competitive advantage vis a
vis companies operating in the importing country. Similarly, while the
portfolio interest exemption stimulates the provision of foreign capital,229
capital-importing countries, in particular developing nations, stand to lose
tax revenue to capital-exporting countries (i.e., developed nations) from
source tax exemptions for interest and other types of portfolio income. 23o

of the underlying economic activities. See J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni,
Reinvigorating Tax Expenditure Analysis and Its International Dimension, 27 VA.
TAX REv. 437, 551-61 (2008).
227. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. Other commentators also
have proposed repealing the portfolio interest exemption, albeit for reasons that
differ from those advanced in this Article. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Memo to
Congress: It's Time to Repeal the U.S. Portfolio Interest Exemption, 17 TAX NOTES
INT'L 1817 (1998) (proposing that Congress repeal the portfolio interest exemption
and instead enact a high withholding tax "on interest and other deductible payments
to nonresidents" that would "be completely refundable on proof that the income ...
has been reported to the tax authorities" in the beneficial owner's country of
residence; basing this proposal on the assertion that the factors that led to the
enactment of the portfolio interest exemption no longer exist and that the exemption
has led to the situation where most cross-border portfolio income is not being taxed
by any jurisdiction, which is "unacceptable from an efficiency [or] equity
perspective"); Michael J. McIntyre, Guidelines for Taxing International Capital
Flows: The Legal Perspective, 46 NAT'L TAX J. 315, 317 (1993) [hereinafter
McIntyre, Guidelines] (recommending that countries harmonize their withholding
taxes on capital income at some positive rate and that the United States should take
the first step towards this end by imposing a low-rate withholding tax on all interest
payments; basing this proposal on the need to mitigate competitive pressures that
undermine countries' imposition of income taxes and to raise revenue).
228. With the title passage rule, the United States is surrendering some
residence taxation; with the portfolio interest exemptions, countries are surrendering
some source taxation.
229. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text. Cf Peter R. Merrill, et
aI, Tax Treaties in a Global Economy: The Case for Zero Withholding on Direct
Dividends, 5 TAX NOTES INT'L 1387, 1388-89 (1992) ("[I]t generally is in every
country's self interest to seek reciprocal elimination of withholding taxes. ").
230. See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of
u.s. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1033-34 (1997) ("Capitalexporting and capital-importing nations have conflicting financial interests: capital
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And developing nations usually struggle between their tax revenue and
foreign capital needs.231 Thus, countries not favoring source exemptions for
portfolio income may well object if the sourcing standard permits such
exemptions, because these countries would then be at a competitive
disadvantage in attracting foreign capital if they were to impose a source tax
on portfolio income.232 Moreover, permitting deviations from the benefits
principle sets a precedent whereby countries may feel justified in varying
their source rules where it suits their national interests, and some such
measures may indeed result in instances of double taxation, thereby
frustrating the goals of a universal sourcing standard. 233
C. Standard for Sourcing Income
The previous section has determined that the sourcing standard
should be developed according to the following two principles: (i) sourcing
income based on the countries that provide the taxpayer with public benefits
importers have the most to gain from taxation at source, capital exporters from
taxation of residents. ").
231. Keinan, supra note 72, at 66; see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization,
Tax Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REv.
1573, 1639-48 (2000) [Hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Globalization]. In this regard,
commentators have warned that "[t]he resulting fiscal sacrifice [by developing
countries from source tax exemptions] is likely to exceed by far the potential benefits
reSUlting from new investment capital." Lee A. Sheppard, News Analysis: Revenge
of the Source Countries, Part III: Source as Fiction, 40 TAX NOTES Int'l 219, 224
(2005) (quoting from a report given by Angel Schindel and Adolfo Atchabahian at
the September 12-16, 2005, International Fiscal Association World Congress in
Buenos Aires, Argentina). Consequently, there is "a growing awareness that the
sensible approach for developing countries is to withhold" tax on payments of
portfolio income to foreign investors. Id; see Cockfield, supra note 84, at 176
(pointing out that many developing nations prefer the provisions contained in the
United Nations model tax treaty, which enhance source taxation); cf OECD Model
2008, supra note 78, at Positions on Article 10 (Dividends) and Its Commentary,
Positions on Article 11 (Interest) and Its Commentary, Positions on Article 12
(Royalties) and Its Commentary (several developing countries reserving their
positions on deviating from the OECD treaty rates for dividends, interest, and
royalties); but cf Keinan, supra note 72, at 676 (contending that although residency
taxation of financial transaction income "would shift revenue from developing
countries to developed countries in the short-run," it would benefit developing
countries in the long-run).
232. With only some countries taxing portfolio income, it can be expected
that most of the tax would be shifted to the borrower in the form of higher interest
payments. See McIntyre, Guidelines, supra note 227, at 317.
233. For example, a country that wants to curb imports may enact a source
rule that results in more domestic source income than that prescribed by the
multilateral sourcing standard.
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that relate to the income and (ii) administrability. This section uses these
principles to develop a standard that can be used to derive particular source
rules. As a first step in developing the standard, it is important to describe in
some detail the types of public benefits that countries provide.
1. Categorizing and Describing Governmental Benefits that Relate
to Income
Taxpayers receive numerous governmental benefits that relate to
their earning and enjoyment of income. The locations where such
governmental benefits are provided can be grouped into three categories: the
situs of the activities giving rise to income; the destination of the property,
capital, or services giving rise to income; and the residence of the person
receiving income. Each of these is examined below.
a.

Countries Where Taxpayer Conducts Activities

Numerous public benefits arise from government services that are
provided in countries where taxpayers conduct income-producing activities.
Included among these public benefits are physical infrastructure (e.g., roads
and telecommunications), economic infrastructure (e.g., banking systems),
legal infrastructure (e.g., court systems and regulatory agencies), public
safety, national security, and a skilled workforce?34 These products of
government activities are either essential for, or contribute greatly to, the
capacity of taxpayers to carry on activities in the particular country. As
discussed previously,235 the receipt of these government benefits justifies a
source tax, and thus the location of these benefits should serve as a basis for
sourcing income. Indeed, several of the current source rules determine the
source of income based on the location of the economic activities giving rise
to the income, which can be viewed as a surrogate for the location of the
public benefits provided; these include the rules for sourcing service
income236 and manufacturing income.237
b.

Countries in Which Taxpayer Provides Property,
Capital, or Services

Where a taxpayer provides property, capital, or services into a
country, the country of destination is providing the taxpayer with
governmental benefits that relate to the earning of income. This is most
234.
235.
236.
237.

See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90.
See supra Part I1I.B.I.
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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easily understood in the fonn of legal protections provided by a destination
country to a taxpayer in connection with royalties received for licensing
patents, copyrights, or other intangibles for use in that country.238 In this
regard, the source rules typically source royalty income based on the location
of the legal protections. 239 Destination countries provide other public benefits
to taxpayers as well. For example, when a taxpayer is providing capital to a
corporation, both the country (or countries) where the corporation conducts
activities as well as the country under whose laws the corporation is fonned
are providing benefits that contribute to the taxpayer's ability to receive
dividend income and stock gains; the fonner country provides benefits in
support of the corporation's activities and the latter country provides the
legal infrastructure that protects and regulates the taxpayer's investment in
the corporation. 240 Current U.S. law recognizes both types of public benefits
in sourcing dividend income, with dividends generally sourced according to
the corporation's country of incorporation, but with exceptions that look to
the place of substantial business activity conducted by the company.241
Similarly, a taxpayer who loans money indirectly profits from the public
benefits received by the borrower in connection with the borrower's incomeproducing activities, which provide the borrower with funds to pay interest to
the taxpayer. 242 The current U.S. source rule is generally in accord with this
view, as it sources interest income based on the residence (in the case of noncorporate borrowers) or country of incorporation (in the case of corporate
borrowers) of the debtor, unless the debtor has substantial business activities
or a banking branch outside its country of residence or incorporation. 243
In addition, the country of destination provides significant public
benefits by perfonning the governmental services essential for establishing a
market for a taxpayer's goods and services. 244 The market in any country
238. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Shay, Fleming & Peroni,
Source Rules, supra note 1, at 143; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at
240-41.
239. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
240. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 63.
241. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
242. Cf Lokken, Source, supra note 49, at 7 (stating that under a benefitsbased model for sourcing income, "interest originates where the borrower utilizes the
borrowed funds because governmental services and protections at that location are
central to the success of the borrower's venture, which generates the capacity to pay
interest on the loan"); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 67 (stating that the general
principle under the current source rules for interest appears to be that the interest is
sourced in the country that is reasonably presumed to be the place where the
borrower derives the income or wealth that funds the interest payments).
243. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
244. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91; AviYonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 540; cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note
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could not exist without the necessary physical, economic, and legal
infrastructure, and this is largely a result of governmental functions?45 And
by accessing a country's market through the sale of goods and services, a
taxpayer is benefiting from these governmental activities, thus justifying a
source tax to some degree on the income earned. While current U.S. law
does not appear to recognize market access as a basis for sourcing income,z46
several leading commentators advocate that the United States should tax
nonresidents as a charge for exploiting the U.S. market,z47 and other notable
analysts view market access as a legitimate basis for exercising source
taxation in genera1. 248

14, at 20 (stating that it might be appropriate to source income from the sale of
inventory in the country in which the purchaser is located, because it is the country
that "has provided the market for the property sold").
245. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91; cf
OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 14 (some members of the Technical
Advisory Group studying the taxation of electronic commerce concluding that
source taxation of a supplier not physically present in a market country is justified
because the business profits derive partly from the use of the country's
infrastructure, such as "means oftransportation (such as roads), public safety, a legal
system that ensure the protection of property rights and a financial infrastructure").
246. An exception to this may be the source rule for international
communications income that is earned by U.S. persons, which treats 50 percent of
such income as foreign source, possibly because the U.S. person is viewed as having
accessed a foreign country's market by transmitting communications or data to that
country. See I.R.C. § 863(e). While not based on the market access rationale, the title
passage rule that applies under U.S. law for inventory sales can produce a source
designation that is consistent with a market access approach. For example, where
inventory is sold into a foreign country with title passing to the buyer in that country,
the income will be foreign source. Of course, sales into the foreign country can also
generate U.S. income if title to the goods passes in the United States. In any event,
simply selling inventory into a country is not likely to result in a source tax in the
absence of some other business activity in that country (and possibly a fixed place of
business if a treaty applies). See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
247. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 91.
248. See Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 540; cf
Graetz, Inadequate Principles, supra note 97, at 299 (stating that countries that
supply only a market for goods and services may have a basis for exercising source
taxation). In this regard, the OECD Technical Advisory Group that was established
to address the taxation of electronic commerce could not reach an agreement as to
whether or not a supplier that is not physically present in a country may be viewed as
using that country's economic and legal infrastructure so as to justify source taxation
ofa portion of the enterprise's profits. See OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at
14.
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Country Where Taxpayer Resides

The taxpayer's country of residence provides public benefits that
relate to the taxpayer's earning and enjoyment of income. Specifically, the
residence country contributes to the ability of a taxpayer to acquire and
protect the wealth arising from income by providing a legal system that
249
governs rights and obligations. These public benefits include the creation
of a court system and the regulation of financial markets and commercial
activity. Moreover, through military protection and agencies that are
responsible for relationships with other nations, a country is providing
services that protect its residents' financial interests in other countries. 250 For
income that is consumed by individuals, the residence country provides
important governmental benefits to the individual that relate to
consumption;251 one would be unable to spend and consume income within a
given country in the absence of the governmental services that support
physical, legal, and economic infrastructure as well as public safety.252
249. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1554 (noting property protection among
the governmental benefits provided by a country to its residents); Reuven S. AviYonah, The Case Against Taxing Citizens 7 (Univ. of Michigan Law School Pub.
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 190, 2010),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1578272 [hereinafter Avi-Yonah, Case Against] (pointing
out that U.S. residents benefit from the rule of law and government protection,
among other government benefits); McLure, supra note 153, at 149 (finding it more
appropriate that the residence country rather than the source country should have the
right to tax the normal return to capital because "the residence country creates the
economic climate favorable to the creation of portfolio capital by practicing public
fiscal virtue and by nourishing private thrift" (quoting from GARY CLYDE
HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM
67 (1992)); cf Zelinsky, supra note 146, at 1316 (concluding that the extensive civil
and social rights of U.S. residents may justify taxing their worldwide incomes under
a benefit theory).
250. See Roin, supra note 184, at 588-89 (pointing out that countries may
assist their residents in the event of military or political instability as well as trade
disputes); Michael S. Kirsch, Taxing Citizens in a Global Economy, 82 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 443, 472-73 (2007) [hereinafter Kirsch, Taxing Citizens]. More specifically,
the United States has entered into dozens of Bilateral Investment Treaties, which
provide U.S. citizens and corporations basic protection for their business operations
and investments in other countries. Id at 473.
251. See Harris, supra note 137, at 447; cf Graetz & Grinberg, supra note
76, at 569 (noting that because countries fund government services that provide for
the well-being of their residents, countries seem to deserve priority in taxing the
foreign portfolio income of their residents).
252. See Jefferson VanderWolk, The Deferral Debate and the Benefits
Theory, 20 TAX NOTES INT'L 1469, 1470 (2000) [hereinafter VanderWolk, Benefits
Theory] (stating that the residence country provides consumption-related services
that support individuals' ability to enjoy income); cf Avi-Yonah, Case Against,
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To an extent, current law appears to recognize the benefits provided
by the residence country in assigning jurisdiction to tax. For example,
although the U.S. rules generally source interest income according to the
residence of the borrower/ 53 most interest paid by U.S. persons to
nonresidents is exempt from U.S. tax under the portfolio interest
exemption. 254 While the stated reason for this exemption is to allow U.S.
borrowers the opportunity to participate in the Eurobond market/55 the
notion that the resident country has a greater right to tax such interest may
also playa role?56 More generally, treaties usually assign the right to tax
interest and royalties to the residence countri57 and significantly reduce the
rate of source taxation on dividends?58 Again, although the prevention of
excessive source taxation is an important reason for these treaty
provisions,259 they also seem to reflect a determination that the residence
country has the greater taxing rights over these types of income,26o or that at
least tax jurisdiction should be shared between the residence and source
countries.
2.

Unifying the Activities, Destination, and Residence Approaches
for Sourcing Income
a.

The Benefits Principle and the Propriety of Split
Sourcing

As discussed above, several countries may be providing
governmental benefits to a taxpayer that relate to the taxpayer's income, with
these countries grouped into three categories - location of activities;
supra note 249, at 7 (pointing out the U.S. residents benefit from the "many
opportunities of a free market economy").
253. See I.R.C. § 861(a)(l).
254. See I.R.C. §§ 871(h), 88l(c). Many developed countries likewise
exempt interest paid to nonresidents. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21, at 194.
255. See supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
256. See ALI PROJECT II, supra note 21 at 194 (providing as a possible
explanation for the portfolio interest exemption that the source country's claim to tax
interest received by a nonresident may be considered to be weak); Graetz &
Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569 (stating that the source country's claim to tax
portfolio income is more attenuated than its claim to tax business income and that
the claims of the residence country seem to deserve priority in the inter-nation
allocation of tax jurisdiction over portfolio income; pointing out that primary
allocation of taxing rights over portfolio income reflects this priority).
257. See supra notes 22, 28 and accompanying text.
258. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 76-78.
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destination of property, capital, or services; and country of residence. In
many situations, more than one country in different categories may provide
benefits. For example, a taxpayer who resides in one country may receive
dividends from a corporation that is incorporated and does business in
another country. In this situation, there are governmental benefits relating to
the income provided by both the residence country (where the taxpayer
resides) and the destination country (where the corporation is incorporated
and does business, which is the destination of the taxpayer's invested
capital). In fact, for a given item of income, countries in all three categories
may provide benefits. For example, a taxpayer who resides in one country
may develop an intangible in another country and license the intangible for
use in a third country. Here, the taxpayer is receiving public benefits from
the residence country, the activities country (where the intangible is
developed), and the destination country (where the intangible is being used).
Current law addresses such situations by sourcing all of the income to one of
the countries involved. 261 Thus, in the first situation, all of the dividends are
sourced to the country of destination despite the public benefits that are also
provided in the residence country.262 And in the second situation, all of the
royalties are sourced to the destination country even though all three
. are benefi·
countrIes
Ihng the taxpayer. 263
The current approach apparently is to choose the country to which
the income primarily relates. 264 However, this can sometime lead to arbitrary
determinations;265 it is not always clear which of the countries is the greatest
contributor to the income in question. More fundamentally, the current
"single source" approach is inappropriate given that often more than one
country is providing significant public benefits. Furthermore, an approach
that seeks to determine the primary country that is providing public benefits
can lead to disagreements among nations,266 and thus does not appear
suitable for multilateral adoption.
Instead, a unified approach is called for, one that recognizes those
countries that provide significant public benefits that relate to the income.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that multilateral source rules be devised
pursuant to a standard that evaluates income for sourcing on the basis of
three factors: the destination of the services, property, or capital giving rise
261. See, e.g., supra notes 19-20,25-27 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
263. See supra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
264. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 242-43; ALI
PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 18 (stating that the current source rules used in the
United States and elsewhere are result of a process that seems ''to require a balancing
of the strength of conflicting claims and considerations as they apply to particular
types of income").
265. See Mason, supra note 84, at 1591.
266. See supra notes 11 ~ 16 and accompanying text.
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to income; the location(s) of the activities giving rise to income; and the
residence of the person receiving income. 267 Each of these countries has the
potential for contributing significantly to the earning and enjoyment of
income, as demonstrated above 268 and as reflected in the current source
rules. 269 Under this standard, a given item of income may have its source
267. Cf Azam, supra note 132, at 30-31 (proposing that source rules for
taxing electronic commerce be developed by taking into account the locations of
producers, consumers, and other physical facilities and components that contribute to
e-commerce income, so that the tax pie can be divided fairly among countries).
These factors, and the bases for them, are conceptually consistent with the idea of
economic allegiance for determining the tax jurisdiction of countries that was
developed by four prominent economists in their seminal report for the League of
Nations. See Economic and Financial Commission, League of Nations, Report on
Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bruins,
Einaudi, Seligman, and Sir Josiah Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S.73F.19
(1923). In determining the meaning of economic allegiance, the report identified four
fundamental considerations: (i) the acquisition of wealth, (ii) the location of wealth,
(iii) the enforceability of the rights to wealth, and (iv) the consumption of wealth. Id.
at 22-23. Corresponding to these considerations are four points that are significant in
determining the appropriate place of taxation: (i) the place of origin of wealth, (ii)
the situs of wealth, (iii) the place of enforcement of the rights to wealth, and (iv)
residence or domicile. Id. at 23. The report concludes that of the four, the place of
wealth origin and residence or domicile of the taxpayer are the most important, with
the other two factors mostly significant in reinforcing the tax claims of the country
of origin or domicile. Id. at 25. In examining the origin of wealth with respect to the
human relations that help create wealth, the report discusses the places where
activities such as management occur as well as "[t]he selling end, that is, the place
where agents for selling ply their calling and where the actual markets are to be
found." Id. at 24. And in applying the economic allegiance criteria to real estate
mortgages, the report views the place of wealth origin as where the land is located,
apparently embracing an approach that determines origin in this context based on the
destination of the loaned capital. See id. at 34-35; but cf id. at 36 (in evaluating the
origin of income on corporate shares, the report favors the place where the owners of
the corporation, i.e., the shareholders, reside, as opposed to the place where the
corporation earns the dividends, especially because determining the location of the
underlying corporate earnings would be complicated where the corporation has
production, sales, or a chief office in more than one country). Thus, similar to the
factors identified in this Article, the League of Nations report focuses on where the
taxpayer resides and where wealth is produced, with the latter apparently taking into
account both the activities giving rise to income along with the destination of the
products or capital in some cases.
268. See supra notes 234-35, 238, 240, 242, 244-45, 249-52 and
accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 236-37, 239, 241, 243, 253-58 and accompanying
text; cf Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 231, at 1586-87 (pointing out that
three types of jurisdictions may, under current rules, impose a tax on cross-border
sales of goods or provision of services: both the supply and demand jurisdictions
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divided among multiple locations. 27o Thus, in the second example above,271 a
portion of the royalty income would be sourced to the residence country, the
activities country, and the destination country. Subsection 3, below,
discusses the specifics of assigning income portions.272

b. Defending the Residence Country Source Portion
F or the most part, commentators appear to view a split-sourcing
approach as appropriate from the standpoint of the benefits principle.273 The

may impose a source tax, and the residence jurisdiction may impose residual tax that
is not taxed by the supply or demand jurisdictions).
270. Cj Kevin A. Bell, Indian Official Says Source Country Should Have
Greater Taxing Rights, INT'L TAX MON., Feb. 26, 2008 (Indian official quoted as
stating that the source country and residence country should each have the right to
tax one half of certain income that originates in India).
271. See supra text accompanying note 261.
272. As voiced by a leading commentator, a concern with the functioning of
source rules is the potential for taxpayers to erode completely their effect in a given
jurisdiction by making deductible payments to related parties located in a second,
low tax jurisdiction. See Edward D. Kleinbard, Stateless Income 62-63 (USC Legal
Studies Research PaperNo. 11-6,2011), http://ssrn.comlabstract=1791769 ("Even if
a multinational enterprise's income is sourced in the first instance by every country
according to some economically rational set of agreed-upon principles, stateless
income tax planning simply extracts the income from the source country (for
example, through deductible interest, royalty, or fee payments) and deposits it in a
tax-friendlier locale."). This concern is based on the assumption that the deductible
payments in the first jurisdiction are not subject to a source tax in that jurisdiction.
See id. at 15. Under the proposed sourcing standard, this should not be the case if, as
the commentator assumes (see id. at 62-63), the first jurisdiction is the destination of
services or an intangible and is not a tax haven - in these circumstances, a portion
of the deductible payments would be sourced and taxed in the first jurisdiction.
273. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 35-36, 48 (stating that it
seems anomalous to assign all of the rental income from leasing tangible property
produced by the taxpayer to the country of use; noting that conceptually royalty
payments received on the license of intangible property developed by the taxpayer
represent income generated by both the creation and exploitation of the intangible);
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 242 (acknowledging that with
regard to royalty income received from the license of intangible property developed
by the taxpayer, both the country that was the situs of development activities and the
country where the intangible is used provide important services and protections);
Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 20-21 (stating that a highly
analytical approach for determining the source of service income might attribute the
income to one or more jurisdictions, each of the contacts with which provides an
economically defensible basis for determining source).
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major concerns with such an approach are administration 274 and coordination
among countries,275 which are addressed in the next subsection. However,
some leading commentators would probably take issue with sourcing a
portion of income to the country of residence. With regard to U.S. source
taxation, they assert that where a nonresident is doing business in the United
States (or possibly accessing the U.S. market), the public benefits provided
by the United States to the nonresident are quite similar to the public benefits
provided to residents, thus Justifying a source tax that is equivalent to that
imposed on U.S. residents. 76 These commentators also are concerned that
U.S. residents would perceive a lower tax for nonresidents as inequitable,
and thus damage the legitimacy and efficacy of the residence tax.277 The
commentators specifically disagree with other analysts,278 who argue that
nonresidents should pay a lower tax than residents on income earned in a
particular country because the nonresidents are receiving fewer public
benefits from that country.279
274. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 36, 48 (pointing out
administrative difficulties of splitting the source of rental income received from
leasing tangible property produced by the taxpayer; pointing out administrative
difficulties of splitting the source of royalty income received from licensing
intangible property developed by the taxpayer); Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra
note 57, at 242-43 (pointing out administrative difficulties of splitting the source of
royalty income received from licensing intangible property developed by the
taxpayer); cf Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 21 (stating that
the U.S. source rule for service income, which looks to the place where services are
performed, is probably based primarily on administrative considerations).
275. See, e.g., ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 37, 48 (stating that no case
has been found in which a country divides the source of rental income between the
place where the leased property was produced and the place where it is being used;
noting that few if any countries divide the source of royalty income between the
place where the licensed property was developed and the place where it is being
used).
276. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 90-91; cf
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 239 (asserting that consumer
benefits received by individuals are not related to the issue of source of income).
277. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 110-11.
278. See id. at 90-91.
279. See Harris, supra note 137, at 457 (the rate of tax on nonresidents with
domestic income should be less than that on residents with domestic income,
"because nonresidents deriving domestic income receive less government services
than residents deriving such income, i.e., they are not in receipt of residence or
consumption services from the domestic government"); VanderWolk, Benefits
Theory, supra note 252, at 1470 (arguing that the taxation offoreign-source business
income should be divided more or less equally between the residence country and
the source country because of the governmental services provided by each country);
Jefferson VanderWolk, Direct Taxation in the Internet Age: A Fundamentalist
Approach, BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, Apr. 2000, at 173, 179
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This criticism is not warranted. First and foremost, assigning a
portion of income to the residence country is in accord with the benefits
principle. 280 Because a resident benefits from home country government
activities with respect to income that is either accumulated or consumed, the
residence country should have a primary right to tax at least a portion of
income that is derived from activities or market access that occurs outside of
that country.281 This in tum should reduce the income over which the
countries of activities and destination should have a right to taX,z82 To
support this proposition, consider the case of an individual who resides in
(proposing an approach under which the tax rate on the local-source income of
nonresidents is lower than the rate on residents' income, because nonresidents
receive less governmental benefits than residents - nonresidents "receive only
production services, not consumption services"); cf Roin, supra note 184, at 591
(stating that "[a] case may be made for imposing a lower tax on the U.S. income of
foreign corporations than on the U.S. income of domestic corporations," because
foreign corporations are receiving less benefits from the United States as compared
to domestic corporations); Avi-Yonah, Case Against, supra note 249, at 7 (in
arguing against the United States taxing nonresidents citizens on their worldwide
income, pointing out that nonresident citizens do not receive certain significant
benefits that are received by U.S. residents or only receive them in a substantially
weaker form).
280. Several commentators agree with this proposition. See supra note 279.
281. See VanderWolk, Benefits Theory, supra note 252, at 1470 (arguing
that the taxation of foreign-source business income should be divided more or less
equally between the residence country and the source country because of the
governmental services provided by each country); Harris, supra note 137, at 462-63
(proposing that residents deriving foreign income should be taxed by the residence
country on their worldwide taxable income at the full residence income tax rate, "but
should receive a tax credit with respect to their foreign income at the source income
tax rate," with the source tax rate being lower than the residence tax rate; this will
result in residents with foreign income contributing to the cost of the "government
services they receive, i.e., consumption services"); Roin, supra note 184 at 588-89
(in arguing for a system where the United States exempts foreign income from
taxation, contending that the government benefits provided by the United States to
U.S. corporations with respect to foreign income "may be substantial enough to
justify some home country tax" on such income); cf McLure, supra note 153, at 149
(finding it more appropriate that the residence country rather than the source country
should have the right to tax the normal return to capital because "the residence
country creates the economic climate favorable to the creation of portfolio capital by
practicing public fiscal virtue and by nourishing private thrift" (quoting from GARY
CLYDE HUFBAUER, U.S. TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL INCOME: BLUEPRINT FOR
REFORM 67 (1992)).
282. See Roin, supra note 184, at 591 ("Exactly the same factors that justify
the imposition of an add-on tax imposed with respect to the foreign income of a U.S.
corporation, then, justify a corresponding downward adjustment in the rate of
corporate tax payable on the domestic income offoreign corporations.").
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Country A but who derives all of her income from Country B, which has a
tax rate that exceeds the Country A tax rate, thus precluding any residual tax
by Country A even if it employed a foreign tax credit system as opposed to
an exemption system. The individual consumes all of her income in Country
A, and uses the banking and financial system of Country A to protect the
wealth that accumulates from the income. Furthermore, the government
activities of Country A, throu&h its military and state department, protect her
property rights in Country B.2 3 If the individual's income were sourced only
on the basis of activities and destination, she would pay no tax to Country A,
despite the public benefits that she receives from Country A. To prevent this,
at least a portion of the taxpayer's income should be assigned to Country A
for primary taxation purposes in order for the taxpayer to shoulder some of
the burden of Country A governmental costs from which the taxpayer clearly
benefits.
As far as the perceived inequity of a country taxing nonresidents less
heavily than residents (which would occur where a portion of the income is
sourced to the residence country), residents may well not feel that they are
being unfairly treated given that nonresidents are receiving fewer benefits in particular, a lack of public benefits relating to personal consumption.
Indeed, an argument can be made that if nonresidents are subject to the same
taxes as residents despite receiving fewer public benefits from the host
country, the nonresidents may be the ones who feel that they are being
treated unfairly. This could result in less compliance by nonresidents as well
as steps taken to reduce their exposure to source taxation - for example, by
avoiding a presence in the host country and instead carrying out host country
activities remotely.
The difference in benefits provided to residents and nonresidents
may also mitigate or eliminate any concerns that nonresidents would have an
advantage in competing with residents in the particular country. A lower
source tax on nonresidents would only present this concern where .the
difference in tax burden is not being made up by tax liability in the residence
country on the portion of the income sourced to it. With substantially
harmonized source rules (the end-product of this Article's endeavor), there
would likely be a lack of a significant residence tax only where the residence
country is not providing important benefits to its individuals and
corporations, such as stable legal protections. 284 In this regard, investors in a
tax haven corporation would likely have a higher degree of legal risk than

283. See Roin, supra note 184, at 588-89; Kirsch, Taxing Citizens, supra
note 250, at 473.
284. Cf Roin, supra note 184, at 589 (differences in the tax rates imposed
by countries often reflect differences in the level of governmental benefits provided)
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investors in a corporation from a developed country.285 Given this tradeoff,
nonresidents may well not have a competitive advantage over residents even
if the nonresidents faced lower overall tax liability?86 Nevertheless, host
countries could always remove any perceived advantage by subjecting the
residence country source portion of income to a form of residual source
taxation - that is, a host country could impose a tax on the entire portion of
a nonresident's income that is derived from the host country, subject to a
credit for any residence country taxes that are imposed on the portion of the
income that is sourced to the residence country.287
An additional reason for assigning a portion of income to the
residence country is to have a reasonable allocation of tax jurisdiction that
can be agreed to by nations on a multilateral basis. Under the destination
component of the proposed standard, where a taxpayer ·earns income by
accessing a country's market, a portion of the income should be assigned to
that country even without the taxpayer's actual presence in the country,
which is not the case under current law. 288 Similarly, the proposed standard
will assign taxing rights over a portion of interest and royalty income to the
destination country, thereby altering the typical rights of residence countries
to tax such income in its entirety.289 These features of the standard thus
expand the reach of source taxation. Allowing residence countries a primary
right to tax a portion of income is an appropriate and fair counterbalance to
these features, and a measure that is more likely to bring about international
accord on a sourcing standard. 290
285. Cf Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 77 n.l72 (noting that despite
the clear tax advantages of using a foreign corporation, it is difficult to find examples
of successful new public firms that have been organized by U.S. entrepreneurs as
foreign firms).
286. Cf Roin, supra note 184, at 588-91 (contending that the proposed
structure, which generally exempts U.S. corporations' foreign income but considers
the imposition of an add-on tax on such, and considers taxing foreign corporations
on U.S. income at a lower rate than that applied to the U.S. income of U.S.
corporations, adheres rather closely to capital export neutrality, with neutrality
"expanded to include governmental benefits").
287. This would be similar to the tax imposed under section 877, under
which a nonresident alien who is treated as having expatriated to avoid U.S. tax is
subject to U.S. tax on U.S. source income, as expanded under the provision, but with
a credit for foreign taxes on income that is taxable solely as a result of section 877.
See I.R.C. § 877(a), (b), (d).
288. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 21-22,28 and accompanying text.
290. Notwithstanding the conceptual basis for residence-based sourcing,
there is a concern over determining the residence of corporations, which of course is
necessary in deciding where to source the residence-based portion of income earned
by corporations. Cf Andrus, supra note 42, at 848 (pointing out that residence-based
source rules will place tremendous pressure on the residence definition). Under U.S.
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Less Stress on Characterization

In addition to doing a better job of effectuating the benefits principle,
the proposed standard would also reduce or possibly eliminate the current
stress that is placed on characterizing income items for purposes of applying
source rules. As mentioned previously, under the current source rules, a great
deal turns on how income is characterized. 291 This is because the current
single source rules result in very different results depending on the type of
income involved. For example, under the U.S. rules, royalties received on a
license of a patent are sourced where the patent derives its legal protection,292
whereas gain on the sale of a patent for a fixed price is sourced where the

law, corporate residency is based on the country of incorporation. See I.R.C. §
7701(a)(4), (5). As a consequence, a publicly traded corporation can avoid being
subject to u.s. tax on its worldwide income, as well as being subject to subpart F on
foreign income, simply by being incorporated outside the United States. See Shay et
aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 746-47. This concern has prompted some
commentators to advocate tests for determining corporate residency that focus on
what are arguably more meaningful factors than the place of incorporation. See id. at
749-55 (evaluating alternative tests and concluding that the place of incorporation
should be retained); Kleinbard, Lessons, supra note 84, at 76 (stating that the current
u.S. corporate residence test can be modernized to look to a corporation's "mind and
management," a U.K. concept). Recently, bills have been proposed in Congress that
would enact a new section 7701(P), which would treat any large or publicly-traded
foreign-<>rganized corporation as a domestic corporation for U.S. tax purposes if the
management and control of the corporation occurs primarily in the United States. See
International Tax Competitiveness Act of 2011, H.R. 62, 112th Cong.; International
Tax Competitiveness Act of2010, H.R. 5328, II1th Cong.; see also Stop Tax Haven
Abuse Act, H.R. 1265, 111th Congo (2009); Stop Tax Haven Abuse Act, S. 506,
111 th Congo (2009); Jim Brown et aI., New York State Bar Association, Report on
the Management and Control Provision of the "International Tax Competitiveness
Act of 2011" (2011) (providing comments on this legislative proposal). While
determining corporate residency is important in crafting harmonized source rules
that use residence-based sourcing, this issue will need to be left for a future
endeavor. For now it may be useful to point out that one basis for sourcing a portion
of income to the residence country, the legal protections provided by that country,
may support a corporate residence test that looks to the country of incorporation;
nevertheless, the fact that a country also provides pubic benefits, such as
infrastructure, that make possible the domestic management activities of a company
may also support a residence test that looks to the place of management and control.
If it is appropriate to focus on factors beyond the place of incorporation, in addition
to the currently proposed legislation, several alternative tests have been suggested
for determining corporate residency for purposes of residence taxation. See Shay et
aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 749-55.
291. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
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seller resides.293 Characterization is particularly problematic in the case of
transactions involving intangibles and electronic commerce, where the
income from a given transaction may take the form of royalties,
compensation, or property gains based on the specific facts and
circumstances. 294
As a consequence, the current approach often leads to a great deal of
uncertainty, as well as the potential for double taxation or non-taxation,
because countries may be characterizing an item differently (even if they
used similar source rules).295 More fundamentally, the current rules are
flawed in that they produce different source results for transactions that are
economically similar. 296 This in turn creates planning opportunities for
taxpayers, with the attendant concerns of manipulation, compliance, and
enforcement. 297 To restate an illustration provided earlier/98 where a U.S.
resident develops an invention in the United States, obtains a foreign patent
on the invention, and then sells the foreign patent for a lump sum, all of the
gain will be U.S. source;299 however, if instead of selling the patent the
taxpayer licenses the patent in exchange for a lump sum royalty for a period
that is slightly less than the patent's remaining life, all of the income would
be foreign source. 300 Despite the similarity in the substance of these two
alternatives, the source results are quite different.
Under the proposed standard, there would be similar source results
regardless of how a transaction is characterized. Because the sourcing
standard calls for rules that would divide the source of income among the
countries of activities, destination, and residence, economically similar
transactions would have the same or similar source results. Specifically, in
the case of an intangible developed by the taxpayer, the standard would
support a rule that allocates the source of royalty income among the country
293. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 102.
295. See supra note 117 and accompanying text.
296. See Harry Grubert, Tax Credits, Source Rules, Trade, and Electronic
Commerce: Behavioral Margins and the Design of International Tax Systems, 58
TAX L. REv. 149, 188 (2005) (pointing out that "the current distinction in the U.S.
source rules between a sale of a good, a royalty, and a service is highly artificial and
serves no policy objective;" stating that the current Treasury regulations for sourcing
income from computer software exemplifies this confusion given that different types
of transactions involving software are highly substitutable from the developer's point
of view).
297. See Noren, supra note 102, at 345 (pointing out that distinguishing ecommerce income among existing source categories appears to be highly prone to
manipulation).
298. See supra notes 105-06 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 105.
300. See supra note 106.

622

Florida Tax Review

[Vol. 11:7

where the intangible was developed, the country where the intangible is
being used, and country where the taxpayer resides. 301 The same rule should
be appropriate for gain from the sale of an intangible developed by the
taxpayer. 302 Consequently, the different source results in the example above
would no longer hold true.
Because the sourcing standard recognizes the public benefits of the
different countries involved, and the location of these benefits relates to the
economic substance of a transaction, rules developed pursuant to the
standard should produce similar sourcing results for transactions with similar
economic substance. This would reduce the uncertainty and potential for
taxpayer manipulation that plague current law. It would also avoid the need
for harmonized characterization rules for nations, which would be necessary
if multilateral source rules continued to use a single source approach with
different rules based on the type of income involved. Although there are
single source rule options for reducing uncertainty and manipulation, such as'
residence-based303 or destination-based sourcing304 for all service and
intangible income, these approaches would be distortive in light of the
benefits principle and may well not be acceptable internationally.305

301. See infra notes 370-73 and accompanying text.
302. See infra notes 374-76 and accompanying text.
303. See Andrus, supra note 42, at 856.
304. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 49-50, 57; Noren, supra note
102, at 345 (suggesting that source rules for e-commerce income focus on the
location of the consumer in order to avoid the difficult classification issues that arise
under current law).
305. See Andrus, supra note 42 at 856. An additional benefit of the
proposed sourcing standard is that there would generally be less opportunity under
foreign tax credit limitations for cross--crediting (see supra note 62 and
accompanying text), given that there would be a greater likelihood that income
treated as foreign source would be subject to a significant tax by a foreign country.
For example, under current U.S. law, portfolio income is typically sourced based on
the destination of capital or property, yet the destination country typically imposes
little or no tax on most types of such income. See supra notes 17-28 and
accompanying text. Under the proposed sourcing standard, only a portion of
portfolio income would be sourced to the country of destination (see supra notes
267-272 and accompanying text), and the destination country would generally be
imposing a tax at a significant rate on that portion (see supra note 139-143).
Consequently, the proposed sourcing standard should reduce the pressure placed on
the strictness of foreign tax credit limitations. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at
348 (pointing out the inverse relationship between the foreign tax credit basket
limitations and the restrictiveness of the source rules for U.S. persons); Shay,
Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 152-53 (same).
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3. Addressing Administrative and Coordination Concerns
a. An Allocation Scheme that Avoids Administrative
Difficulties
Commentators who agree that the current source rules are arbitrary
because they typically choose the primary country that provides related
public benefits, while ignoring other countries that are also providing
benefits, view the current approach as necessary.306 That is, while in a given
situation there may be connections to several different countries, an approach
that attempted to attribute income to each of the countries involved would be
overly complex and administratively difficult. 307
While taking into account all benefit-providing nations would be
unworkable, the proposed standard eschews such an approach in favor of one
that limits the source inquiry to the countries that are likely to provide
significant public benefits that relate to the income in question. Thus, certain
less significant connections, such as the residence of the payer or the place
where payment is made, are ignored because it is administratively impossible
to allocate income to every country with some connection to the transaction.
In applying the standard to devise rules, certain additional lines
should be drawn to promote administrability. For example, service income
should be sourced without regard to where the taxpayer was educated or
developed her skills. Although the development of human capital is related
to earning compensation income and could fall within the activity component
of the proposed sourcing standard,308 taking this into account appears too
difficult administratively; moreover, human capital development would
likely occur at the place where services are performed,309 and under the
standard a portion of the income will be sourced there in any event. In the
same vein, source rules devised pursuant to the standard should use
reasonably certain indicia for the place of activities or destination. For
example, in determining the destination of goods or services, the rules should
use well-developed factors such as the "use, consumption, or disposition"
concept that is currently used under U.S. law. 310 Similarly, it would be
306. See, e.g., Christians, Donaldson & Postlewaite, supra note 80, at 202l.

307. See id. at 20.
308. Cj Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 140
(arguing that the country where a service provider'S extensive human capital was
developed would seem to have a claim to tax a portion of the service income).
309. See Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 76, at 569.
310. See Reg., § 1.864-6(b)(3)(ii). Nevertheless, with the potential for split
sourcing of income between activities and destination countries, there will be the
need for more factual determinations than under current law's single source
approaches.
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advisable for the location of taxpayer activities to be limited to those
jurisdictions where taxpayers engage in significant activities involving
manufacturing, sales, development, or services that relate to the income in
question.
The most important administrative issue with the proposed sourcing
standard is determining the portions of income that should be assigned to the
different components. That is, once it is decided that an item of income
should be divided among the standard's components, what method should be
used to make the allocation? For many situations, there would not be a
precise basis for making allocations. For example, it would be nearly
impossible to value the public benefits provided by the residence country in
order to determine an allocation for the residence country component,
assuming that the allocation of income based on the relative amount of
public benefits provided by jurisdictions is considered appropriate. 311
Likewise, where income is allocated to the destination country because a
taxpayer has accessed that country's market by selling goods or services into
the country, the value of the public benefits provided by the destination
country appears to be indeterminable. In some cases, arm's length pricing
principles may provide a basis for making allocations, but these principles
would only be helpful in assigning income to business-related activities and
transactions. Thus, the arm's length method would not be able to determine
the portion of portfolio income that should be allocated to a residence
country, or the appropriate allocation of income between the country of sales
activities and the country of destination. Yet, some allocation is appropriate
in light of the public benefits provided at the different locations.
To address these difficulties, allocations among the components of
the sourcing standard generally should be made using fixed percentages that
are mutually agreed upon by countries.3\2 An inexact allocation using fixed
percentages is the only practical approach for split sourcing where it is not
possible to determine with any degree of precision the relative value of
311. In this regard, several leading commentators have expressed their
opposition to an approach that would partially exempt international income from the
tax bases of the source and residence countries based on the view that international
income receives fewer governmental benefits than income earned within a taxing
country by its residents. See Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at
334-37. The commentators object to this approach in part because the approximate
cost of the government benefits provided by the countries involved is not capable of
being measured. See id. at 336-37.
312. The determination of these percentages should generally be made
based on a rough evaluation of the amount of public benefits provided by the
residence, activities, and destination countries. However, as mentioned previously, it
may be appropriate also to take into account equity considerations underlying
ability-to-pay taxation in determining the portion of the income that is sourced to the
country of residence. See supra notes 183-85 and accompanying text.
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government benefits provided by countries. And such an approach is superior
to no allocation at all because it at least recognizes that more than one
country is providing significant government benefits that relate to the
income.313 As an illustration of this approach, countries may decide that
service income should be allocated by assigning one third of the income to
each of the countries where the services are performed, where the services
are used or consumed, and where the taxpayer resides. 314
The use of fixed percentage allocations to source income has support
under current law. For income that is attributable to transportation that either
begins or ends in the United States, the current U.S. rules treat 50 percent of
the gross income as U.S. source and 50 percent as foreign source. 315 The U.S.
rules also use a 50-50 method to source international communications
income that is earned by U.S. persons. 316 Similarly, income from the
manufacture and sale of inventory is generally sourced by allocating 50
percent of income to the place of manufacturing and 50 percent of the
income to the place of sales. 317 Furthermore, the apportionment formulas
used by U.S. states provide analogous support for using fixed percentages in
sourcing income. These formulas typically apportion income among states
by using fixed percentage factors - for example, an equally weighted threefactor formula that takes into account the location of sales, payroll costs, and
assets. 318 Recently, some commentators have proposed using similar formula
apportionment schemes in lieu of transfer pricing to allocate income among
affiliated corporations. 319 These measures reflect a judgment that where more
precise allocations are unavailable or too difficult, a reasonable allocation of
tax jurisdiction based on fixed percentages is superior to no allocation
whatsoever.
As alluded to above, it would be appropriate to use arm's length
pricing principles to allocate income within the activities component. For
example, in lieu of the 50-50 method generally used under U.S. law to
313. Moreover, an inexact method of allocating income should not be
viewed as inappropriate given that the benefits principle's equity basis for sourcing
is somewhat imprecise in light of the value judgments involved. See supra notes
155-157, 182 and accompanying text.
314. Cf Bell, supra note 270 (Indian official quoted as stating that giving
the residence and source countries the rights to tax one half of certain income that
originates in India "would be an amicable resolution of the problem").
315. See I.R.C. § 863(c).
316. See I.R.C. § 863(e).
317. See Reg. § l.863-3.
318. See Charles E. McClure, Jr., Legis/ative, Judicia/, Soft Law, and
Cooperative Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the US and the
EO, 14 COLUM. 1. EUR. L. 377, 420-21 (2008) (describing the formulary methods
used by U.S. states to apportion business income).
319. See, e.g., Avi-Y onah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 136.
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allocate income between manufacturing activities and sales activities, it
would be advisable to base such allocations on the ann's length method. 320
This would allow for a determination that takes into account the economic
income attributable to these activities, which should serve as a reasonable
proxy for the relative amount of government benefits provided at these
locations. The use of arm's length principles to allocate income among a
taxpayer's activities would also promote the neutral treatment of activities
conducted through branches and subsidiaries, given the use of the arm's
length method to allocate income where activities are conducted through
affiliated corporations. 321 For the same reasons, it would be appropriate to
use arm's length principles to allocate income within the activities
component in other situations, such as in the case of global dealing
operations involving financial products. 322 The use of ann's length principles
in these and other similar situations is generally consistent with the
functional separate entity method that is authorized by the OECD model
treaty as well as by some recent U.S. treaties. 323
In theory, arm's length principles can also be used in certain
situations to allocate income between the activities component and the
destination component of the sourcing standard. For example, where a bank
incorporated in Country A makes a loan to a resident of Country B, with all
of the loan activities done at a branch located in Country C, it may be
possible to divide the interest income received by the bank between the
activities and destination components by determining an arm's length charge
for the banking services performed by the Country C branch. This may
provide an economically justifiable way of determining the portion of the
interest that represents compensation for the banking services and the portion
that represents compensation for the use of money. (A portion would still
need to be assigned to Country A, the residence country). However, a
320. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 29-33 (recommending that the
source of income from the production and sale of tangible personal property be
determined by apportioning the income between the countries of production
activities and sales activities using arm's length principles).
321. See Fred B. Brown, Federal Income Taxation of us. Branches of
Foreign Corporations: Separate Entity or Separate Rules?, 49 TAX L. REv. 133,
193-95 (1993); ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 33. Nevertheless, the results under
the sourcing standard for subsidiary versus branch operations will differ where
parent and subsidiary corporations have different residences, in light of the residence
component of the standard.
322. Proposed Treasury regulations are in accord with this approach. See
Prop. Reg. § 1.482-8.
323. See, e.g., OEeD Model, supra note 15, at art. 7; U.S. Model, supra
note 22, at art. 7. Unlike the treaty separate entity method, however, the proposed
standard would source a portion of the income based on the residence of the
taxpayer.
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problem with using arm's length principles to make this allocation is that
since the interest would be received over time, it would be necessary to
apportion each payment of interest between the banking services element and
use of money element, which would require the use of present value concepts
to achieve a degree of accuracy. Moreover, given the uncertainty in
determining an arm's length charge for the banking services at the Country C
branch, using this method would severely complicate the application of a
withholding tax on the interest in Country B, although procedures could be
created that would allow the bank to claim a refund for over-withholding by
demonstrating the amount of interest that is properly assignable to the
Country C banking branch. 324
Even more troublesome would be using arm's length principles to
allocate royalty income between a taxpayer's development activities in one
country and the use of the intangible in another country. In theory, such
income could be economically divided by determining the value of the
intangible and then using this value to allocate the royalties between the
portion that represents a return of the value of the intellectual property and
the portion that represents a return on the intellectual property.325 However,
in addition to the problems discussed above, there is a great deal of
uncertainty in valuing intangibles. 326 Moreover, even after determining the
value of the intangible, in the case of contingent royalties there would be the
added difficulties of determining the extent to which the royalties represent a
return of this value, given that the time period that the intangible would be
productive can only be roughly estimated and the annual royalties will
typically vary over the life of the intangible. 327 Because of these problems,
the American Law Institute decided to forgo any allocation to the place of
development activities, and instead source royalties in their entirety to the
location where the intangible is used.328 Without delving into the details,
other commentators, however, appear to suggest that an allocation between
the locations where an intangible is developed and used should at least be
considered. 329
Because of these difficulties, fixed percentages should be used to
allocate income between the activities and destination components of the
sourcing standard, with the particular percentages determined by
324. Cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 36 (discussing similar
administrative problems with an approach that would use arm's length principles to
divide the source of income from the production and lease of tangible property).
325. See id. at 48.
326. See id. at 49; See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 243.
327. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 243.
328. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 48-49. A leading commentator
on international taxation also came to the same conclusion. See Lokken, Intellectual
Property, supra note 57, at 242-43.
329. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 143.

628

Florida Tax Review

{Vol. 11:7

international agreement. The same approach should be used for other
activities-destination allocations. The use of arm's length principles for this
purpose is too difficult administratively, but an allocation is warranted in
light of the government benefits received in each location. Thus, as stated
previously, where other methods are not available, a reasonable, fixed
percentage allocation is superior to no allocation at all. And the fact that the
percentages would need to be agreed upon internationally should ensure that
they are reasonable. 330
b.

Market Access and Enforcement Concerns

Where a nonresident generates income by accessing the market of
another country, a portion of the income should in principle be sourced to
this country under the destination component of the sourcing standard due to
the governmental benefits provided to the taxpayer by the country whose
market is penetrated. 331 Thus, where a wholesaler who resides in one country
sells goods from a branch in that country to an independent retailer located in
another country, the destination country should have the right to tax the
wholesaler on a portion of the income on the sale. And it should be feasible
for the destination country to collect the tax by requiring the retailer to
withhold. However, if the sale by the nonresident seller were directly to
consumers in the destination country through electronic commerce or other
remote selling techniques, the collection of the tax would be more
problematic, given that consumers may not be reliable withholding agents. 332
While there may be ways to create an enforcement structure for these
situations,333 the important point is that in devising source rules, the
allocation of income under the destination component would be dependent
on addressing enforcement concerns for taxing electronic commerce and
other types of remote selling.

330. While this Article does not address the subject of sourcing deductions
(see supra note 16), it should be noted that the proposed approach's potential for
split sourcing of income items will further complicate the allocation and
apportionment of deductions to income from different sources. This should not be
overly burdensome for taxpayers and tax authorities, as deductions allocated to split
sourced income could be apportioned to the income from different sources based on
the relative amounts of such income. Cf Reg. § 1.863-3(d) (using this method to
allocate and apportion deductions to income from the manufacture of sale of
inventory where the 50-50 method is used to determine the source of such income).
331. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
332. See Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1053 & n.264.
333. See infra note 364.
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The Need/or International Agreement

That there be substantial international agreement on the sourcing
standard and the rules developed thereunder is critical to the success of this
Article's endeavor. 334 In the absence of such agreement, there would likely
be an unacceptable amount of double taxation and non-taxation. This is
because the proposed split sourcing approach is inconsistent with the current
single source approaches that are typically used by countries. Thus, if some
countries use the proposed standard to devise source rules, but many other
countries did not, there would be a great amount of inconsistency in the
source rules used by nations - probably considerably more so than under
current law. 335
This Article recommends that the United States should take the lead
in advocating the international acceptance of the proposed sourcing
standard. 336 The key would be having the support of the OECD,337 which
could then work to turn the sourcing standard into source rules that can be
adopted by at least a substantial majority of countries. 338
International agreement may well be attainable. In particular, it is
certainly possible that countries could agree to share tax jurisdiction by
agreeing to the fixed percentages that would generally be used to allocate
income among the activities, destination, and residence countries. The fact
334. Cf OECD, E-Commerce, supra note 107, at 25 (stressing the need for
universal agreement on rules for allocating taxing rights over business profits in
order to prevent double taxation or non-taxation).
335. Cf Fleming, Peroni & Shay, Fairness, supra note 165, at 339
(pointing out that the unilateral adoption of an approach that fractionally apportioned
international income between the source and residence countries would result in
double taxation probably being over- or under-mitigated in most cases).
336. This would be similar to the United States having taken the lead in
promoting the international adoption of the arm's length method for allocating
income among commonly controlled corporations. See Barbara Angus, Tom Neubig,
Eric Solomon & Mark Weinberger, The U.S. International Tax System At a
Crossroads, 127 TAX NOTES 45, 64 (2010).
337. Cf Graetz, Multilateral Solution, supra note 84, at 493 (suggesting
that the OECD and European Commission might lead the way in achieving a
multilateral agreement for the treatment of interest expense that is based on
worldwide allocation).
338. Cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Ilan Benshalom, Formulary
Apportionment - Myths and Prospects: Promoting Better International Tax Policy
by Utilizing the Misunderstood and Under-Theorized Formulary Alternative 26
(Univ. of Michigan Pub. Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series, Paper No. 221,
2010), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1693105 (claiming that for a hybrid arm'slength/formulary apportionment regime to be operative, it would be sufficient if a
"critical mass of countries that includes some major developed and emerging
economies [adopts] such a regime").
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that countries entering into tax treaties typically use identical provisions to
reduce or eliminate source taxation on passive income demonstrates that
such agreement is possible. 339 And beyond the split-sourcing aspect of the
standard, the proposed approach is not at all radical: rather than introducing a
new basis for allocating tax jurisdiction, the standard unifies into a splitsourcing approach the concepts that are currently used separately in single
source rules?40
IV.

USING THE STANDARD TO DEVISE SOURCE RULES

This part uses the standard developed in the preceding part to
suggest source rules for several types of income. The objective here is not to
propose a comprehensive and detailed set of source rules that should be
adopted on a multilateral basis. Instead, it is to illustrate how the standard
can be used to formulate certain source rules in order to provide a foundation
for future efforts in this area.
339. See supra notes 22-23, 28 and accompanying text.
340. See supra Part III.C.2. International agreement on this Article's
sourcing approach should be considerably less difficult than the multilateral adoption
of formulary apportionment to allocate tax jurisdiction over the income of related
multi-national corporations, a concept advocated recently by several notable
commentators (see supra note 136). First, unlike the proposed sourcing approach,
many nations may be quite reluctant to adopt formulary apportionment in lieu of
arm's-length transfer pricing, given the lack of experience with large-scale
formulary apportionment and the unknowns that it presents. See Kleinbard, Lessons,
supra note 84, at 66 (referring to the susceptibility of formulary apportionment to
gaming as an important unknown; concluding that "[i]t is difficult to imagine how a
multilateral global formulary apportionment system can come to pass"). Second, as
compared to the adoption of uniform source rules, multilateral agreement on
territorial taxation with formulary apportionment would involve greater tax stakes in
that countries would exercise tax jurisdiction only over that income that is
apportioned to them pursuant to the formula; with uniform source rules, countries
would still have the option of exercising residual tax jurisdiction over their residents
via foreign tax credit systems, as well as retain the ability to employ mechanisms
designed to prevent their residents from avoiding current taxes on certain income
that is allocated to tax haven corporations (see supra note 139). With lower tax
stakes, international agreement on source rules should be more feasible. Finally, a
multilateral formulary apportionment system would require agreement on not only
apportionment factors, but also on the tax base that would be subject to
apportionment, the latter appearing quite unlikely given the differences in countries'
tax bases and the value that countries attach to their particular tax regimes. See AviYonah & Benshalom, supra note 338, at 15 (stating that "any attempt to form a
comprehensive corporate tax base in the near future suffers from high failure
probabilities"). Harmonized source rules would not require multilateral agreement
on a common tax base.
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To recap, under the sourcing standard, the source of income should
be evaluated on the basis of three factors: the destination of the services,
property, or capital giving rise to income; the location(s) of the activities
giving rise to income; and the residence of the person receiving income.
Based on this evaluation, a given item of income may have its source divided
among multiple locations. Below this standard is applied to suggest source
rules for the following types of income: interest, dividends and stock
gains/ 41 service income, income from intangibles, and inventory income. 342
A. Interest
In using the standard to devise source rules for interest income, there
should be separate treatment for interest received by passive investors and
interest received by active lenders, such as banks and other financial
businesses. For passive investors, the source of interest income should be
341. Source rules developed pursuant to the standard would also need to
address income from financial derivatives such as interest rate and equity swaps.
One commentator has argued that because of the difficulty in subjecting equity
swaps to U.S. source taxation, the United States should consider exempting U.S.
source portfolio dividends (and perhaps all other U.S. source non-business income)
earned by foreign persons from treaty countries. See Colon, supra note 146, at 780.
Recently, Congress has gone in the opposite direction, and enacted a provision that
sources payments pursuant to equity swaps involving U.S. source dividends (and
other dividend equivalents involving U.S. source dividends) as if they were actual
U.S. source dividends. See I.R.C. § 871(m).
342. As mentioned previously, since it is contemplated that there will be
multilateral agreement on source via harmonized domestic rules, treaties would not
generally alter the taxing rights of countries, although treaties may still affect to
some degree the tax rates that apply to particular types of income. See supra 143 and
accompanying text. With regard to the permanent establishment threshold for
subjecting business income to source taxation, for administrative reasons it may be
advisable to modify the threshold rather than eliminate it entirely. The current
threshold, which relies on physical presence (see supra notes 37-38 and
accompanying text), should not be used; it would prevent source taxation of income
from remote activities that would be sourced to the destination country pursuant to
the proposed sourcing standard. However, subjecting remote sellers or service
providers to the tax jurisdiction of destination countries in all situations could be
administratively burdensome for taxpayers and tax authorities. Accordingly, it may
be sensible to retain the permanent establishment threshold, but modify it so that a
taxpayer would not be subject to source taxation on business income where there are
a de minimis amount of sales into a country. Other commentators have made similar
recommendations. See, e.g., Avi-Yonah, Globalization, supra note 231, at 1671. Of
course, modifying the permanent establishment threshold to remove the physical
presence requirement raises enforcement concerns in taxing remote sellers and the
like, which would need to be addressed in devising source rules. See supra Part
II1.C.3.b.
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divided between the residence country of the interest recipient and the
destination country of the funds that are loaned. Because a passive investor
will have performed minimal activities in making the loan, none of the
interest should be sourced under the activities component of the standard.
The division of the interest income between the residence and destination
countries should be based on a fixed percentage that is agreed to
internationally.
There are several possibilities for determining the destination of the
loaned funds, considering the public benefits that relate to the interest
income. One option would be to source the destination component according
to the residence of the borrower. This is based on the view that the
borrower's country of residence is presumably where the borrower derives
the income or wealth that fund the interest payments, and that the public
benefits provided by this country thus indirectly benefit the interest
recipient. 343 A more refined approach in this regard would be to focus on
specific factors that indicate the location of the borrower's economic
activities; for this ~urpose, the relevant activities could be those of the
borrower in general 44 or those that relate to funding the particular interest
payments. 345 A third option would be to combine the first two options: the
destination of the loaned funds would presumptively be the residence of the
borrower unless there are clear indicia that the borrower was conducting
relevant economic activities at another location. This third option appears the
most appropriate as it strikes a reasonable balance between the benefits
principle and administrabilty. It is also similar to the approach under current

343. Cf Lokken, Source, supra note 49, at 28 (stating that under a benefitsbased model for sourcing income, "interest originates where the borrower utilizes the
borrowed funds because governmental services and protections at that location are
central to the success of the borrower's venture, which generates the capacity to pay
interest on the loan;" concluding that the current source rule for interest, which
generally assigns all interest income to the obligor's country of residence, is
probably the best available approximation given the practical difficulties of a more
refined approach and the fact that most obligors locate their activities and
investments predominantly in their countries of residence); ALI PROJECT I, supra
note 14, at 67-68 (stating that the general principle underlying the source rules for
interest appears to be that interest should be sourced in the country that is reasonably
presumed to be the place where the borrower derives the income or wealth from
which the interest is paid; stating that a fair presumption is that in most cases the
borrower's country of residence or domicile is where the borrower's economic
interests are centered).
344. Cf ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 68 (pointing out that in certain
circumstances, current U.S. law disregards the borrower's residence or domicile and
sources interest based on the geographic composition of the borrower's income).
345. Cf id. at 69-70 (recommending an approach for sourcing interest that
in part focuses on the location of real estate or a business that the interest relates to).
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U.S. law,346 except that the U.S. rule applies to source the entire amount of
interest, as opposed to just the destination component.
Where the interest recipient is a bank or other financial entity, the
source results should be the same as above except that a portion of the
interest income would also be assigned to the country (or countries) where
the taxpayer conducts significant activities that relate to the lending
transaction. As discussed previously, the portion sourced to the activities
component should be based on a fixed percentage agreed to internationally.
This portion may be further apportioned between two or more countries
where significant activities related to the transaction occur at multiple
countries; such apportionment could be done either based on the ratio of
arm's length charges for the lending activities at the different locations or by
using fixed percentages.
B. Income from Corporate Stock
1. Dividends

Dividend income should be sourced in a manner that is similar to the
sourcing of interest income. That is, for passive investors a portion of the
dividends should be allocated to the shareholder's residence country and a
portion should be allocated to the destination country of the invested capital,
with the portions determined on the basis of a fixed percentage. As with
interest received by passive investors, none of the dividend income should be
sourced based on the activities component of the standard; this is because the
shareholder's activities in connection with earning the dividends are likely to
be minimal.
Similar to sourcing interest income, there are several options in
determining the destination country of the shareholder's invested capital.
One possibility would be to look to the country of incorporation based on the
view that this country is providing the shareholder with public benefits
through its legal system that protects and regulates the shareholder's
investment in the corporation. 347 Alternatively, the destination country could
be considered the country or countries where the corporation is engaged in
significant business activities. 348 This is because such countries provide
346. See supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
347. Cj ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 62-63 (stating that the traditional
rule, which sources dividends to the country of the distributing corporation's
domicile, gives controlling weight to the fact that the distributing corporation derives
its legal capacity from its country of domicile).
348. Cj id. at 63 (referring to this approach as alternative way of sourcing
dividends). Whether activities in a country are considered significant for this purpose
could be based on a certain threshold percentage of the corporation's gross income.
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 861(a)(2)(B) (using a threshold of 25 percent of a foreign
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public benefits that relate to the corporate earnings that in turn are the
economic source of the dividends;349 in other words, the countries where the
corporation conducts activities provide indirect public benefits to the
shareholders. A third option would be to take into account both the
corporation's country of incorporation and significant activities countries by
apportioning the destination portion of the dividend among these countries; if
this is done, a fixed percentage should be used for this purpose. If all or a
portion of the destination portion of the dividend is sourced according to the
location of the corporation's significant business activities, it would be
advisable to base this determination on the composition by source of the
.,
•
350
corporatIon s gross lDcome.
Determining the source of dividend income based on the income
composition of a corporation raises comelications in imposing a source tax
that is collected through withholding. 3 I For this reason,352 in lieu of a
secondary dividend tax, the United States and some other countries exact a
second level of tax on the domestic earnings of foreign corporations by
imposing a branch profits tax on such corporations.353 Assuming that the
destination portion of dividends will not be sourced exclusively on the basis
of the corporation's country of incorporation, countries should continue to
have the option of using a branch profits tax as a surrogate for taxing a
portion of dividends.
Where the dividend recipient is a securities dealer or otherwise
holding corporate stock in the conduct of an active business, it seems
appropriate to modify the source results by assigning a portion of the
dividend to the country (or countries) where the taxpayer conducts
significant activities that relate to the acquisition of the stock. If this is done,
corporation's gross income being U.S. effectively connected income to determine
whether a portion of dividends paid by the corporation is sourced to the United
States).
349. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 63; Lokken, Source, supra note
49, at 27.
350. To illustrate, if the third option were used, a fixed percentage of the
destination portion of the dividend would be assigned to both the corporation's
country of incorporation and the country (or countries) where the corporation
conducts economic activities; where the corporation has significant activities in more
than one country, the latter portion would be further apportioned according to the
percentages of corporate income derived from each country.
351. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 1036-37; ALI PROJECT I,
supra note 14, at 141; Fred B. Brown, Reforming the Branch Profits Tax to Achieve
Neutrality, 25 VA. TAX REv. 1219, 1225 (2006) [hereinafter Brown, Branch Profits
Tax].
352. See 1986 BLUEBOOK, supra note 60, at 1037; Brown, Branch Profits
Tax, supra note 351, at 1225.
353. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 884; see also Ault & Arnold, supra note 5, at 51617.
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the portion sourced to the activities component should be based on a fixed
percentage agreed to internationally. This portion may be further apportioned
between two or more countries where significant activities related to the
transaction occur at multiple countries; such apportionment could be done
either based on the ratio of arm's length charges for the activities at the
different locations or by using fixed percentages.
2.

Stock Gains

The gain on the sale of stock by Eassive investors should be sourced
in the same way as dividend income. 54 Economically, a stock gain is
essentially a market capitalization of a corporation's future earnings. 355
Consequently, the same reasons that support the rights of the residence and
destination countries to tax portions of the dividend should apply with equal
force to stock gains. 356 In particular, the country or countries where the
corporation is incorporated and/or doing business are providing the selling
shareholder with important public benefits that contribute to the value of the
stock investment, both directly through legal protection and indirectly
through benefits provided to the corporation. While current law usually
sources stock gains realized by investors exclusively to the taxpayer's
country of residence/ 57 this treatment appears to be mainly due to perceived
administrative and enforcement concerns of imposing a source tax on such
gains. 358 As has been pointed out by other commentators, these concerns can
be addressed by applying withholding procedures similar to those that apply
under U.S. law for taxing foreign persons on sales of stock in U.S. real
property holding corporations. 359
C. Service Income

Income received for performing services should be sourced by
dividing the income among the country where the service provider resides,
the country (or countries) where the services are performed, and the country
where the services are either used or consumed. Fixed percentages should be
used for making these allocations. Where services are performed in more
354. Stock gains realized by dealers should be sourced according to the
rules for inventory. See infra Part IV.E.
355. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122.
356. Id. (stating that if the market access rationale supports a source tax on
dividends, it should also support a source tax on stock gains).
357. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
358. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 122.
359. See Cynthia Blum, How the United States Should Tax Foreign
Shareholders, 7 VA. TAX REv. 583, 643-51 (1988); Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source
Rules, supra note 1, at 145.
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than one country, the place of performance portion should be further
apportioned between two or more countries based on either the time spent or
payroll costs incurred in each of the countries in performing the services.
Under this rule, where services are performed in one country for use or
consumption in another country, both countries, in addition to the service
provider's country of residence, would have the primary right to tax a portion
of the income. While current U.S. law focuses exclusively on where the
services are performed, some countries use a destination approach for
sourcing service income/ 6o and a few commentators view market access as a
justification for imposing a source tax on services performed remotely.361
Indeed, a recent article emphasizes that the continued reliance on a service
provider's physical presence in sourcing service income will become
increasing~ untenable with the prevalence of remote services in the modern
economy.3 2 While not inconsistent with these views, this Article calls for an
approach that divides the source of service income in recognition of the
public benefits provided at each of the relevant locations.
An important caveat to the suggested rule for sourcing service
income is the ability of the destination country to enforce a source tax on
services performed remotely. While withholding by the service recipient
should be feasible where the recipient is a business, difficulties will be
encountered where services are rendered remotely to a broad range of
individual consumers, such as in the case of electronic commerce. 363
Enforcement mechanisms must be developed before the implementation of a
rule that sources a portion of service income to the destination of remotely
performed consumer services. In this regard, commentators have suggested
possible enforcement structures for taxing electronic commerce. 364
360. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
361. See Avi-Yonah, Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 537-40;
Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1040-41 & n.211, 1066. In a similar vein,
another commentator has proposed a market state approach to the sourcing of service
receipts for dividing the business income of multi state enterprises under unITPA
for state corporate income tax purposes. See John A. Swain, Reforming the State
Corporate Income Tax: A Market State Approach to the Sourcing of Service
Receipts, 83 TuL. L. REv. 285, 346-53 (2008).
362. See Kirsch, Services, supra note 146, at 1073.
363. See id. at 1053.
364. See Shay, Fleming & Peroni, Source Rules, supra note 1, at 145-46
(stating that because electronic commerce involves "credit or debit charges, or
electronic cash payment facilities, it may be possible to rely on these payors in some
fashion to structure a viable enforcement mechanism in the future"); Avi-Yonah,
Electronic Commerce, supra note 135, at 537-38 (proposing a gross withholding tax
that would be imposed "by the Demand Jurisdiction unilaterally by forbidding
merchants from selling goods to its residents unless procedures for withholding the
tax are in place").
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D. Income from Intangibles
I.

Royalties

In using the standard to devise a source rule for royalties, it is
important to distinguish between situations where the taxpayer purchased the
intangible that is licensed and where the taxpayer developed the licensed
intangible. In the former situation, the source of royalty income should be
divided between the licensor's country of residence and the country where
the intangible is used. This assumes that the taxpayer is not engaged in an
active business of licensing intangibles, and thus none of the royalty income
should be sourced based on the activities component of the standard because
the taxpayer's activities would seem to be relatively insignificant to the
economics of the transaction. 365 If the transaction occurs in the active
conduct of a licensing business, it should be appropriate to allocate a portion
of the royalties to the country or countries where the licensing activities take
place. 366 As in other situations, the division of the royalty income should be
based on fixed percentages.
The place of use should typically be the country that provides the
legal protections that relate to the intangible. 367 This country should have the
right to tax a portion of the royalties because through its laws and legal
system the destination country provides the taxpayer with the public benefits
that permit the earning of the royalty income. 368 The destination country also
provides the taxpayer with indirect benefits that relate to the royalty income
by providing public benefits to the taxpayer's licensee that contribute to the
licensee's ability to earn income that is typically shared with the licensor via
contingent royalty payments. 369
365. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Lokken, Intellectual
Property, supra note 57, at 240.
366. Current U.S. law provides some support for sourcing a portion of
royalties to the place where a taxpayer performs significant licensing activities in
connection with an active business. Under section 864(c), foreign source royalties
received by a foreign person are subject to U.S. net basis taxation where the royalties
are derived in the active conduct of a U.S. business and attributable to the foreign
person's U.S. office. See I.R.C. § 864(c)(4)(A) and (B), (c)(5). Of course, under this
provision, the United States has tax jurisdiction over the entire amount of the
royalties, not just a portion.
367. See Shay et aI., Task Force, supra note 26, at 773. As under current
law, complications would arise in determining the place of use where the intangible
provides protection in more than one country. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at
50-52; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 277-86.
368. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45; Lokken, Intellectual
Property, supra note 57, at 240-41.
369. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 45
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Where the taxpayer developed the licensed intangible, the source of
the royalty income should be divided among the taxpayer's country of
residence, the country (or possibly countries37!) where significant
development activities took place, and the country where the intangible is
used; again, fixed percentages should be used to divide the income. 371 The
country where significant development activities occur provides important
public benefits in support of such activities and thus should have the right to
tax a portion of the royalty income.372 And using a fixed percentage to assign
a portion of the royalties to the development country should remove the
administrative concerns regarding such allocations that have been voiced by
commentators. 373 While this allocation approach is imprecise, it is superior to
ignoring the development country in assigning source in light of the public
benefits provided there.

2. Intangible Gains
Gain on the sale of an intangible should be sourced in the same
manner as royalties. 374 Thus, for purchased intangibles, the source of the gain
should be divided between the taxpayer's country of residence and the
country where the intangible will be used; for developed intangibles, the
370. Where the taxpayer conducts significant development activities in two
or more countries, it may be advisable to further apportion the portion of the
royalties assigned to development activities; this should probably be done using
fixed percentages because of difficulties in valuing the relative contributions of
different development activities.
371. This assumes that the licensing transaction is not in connection with an
active business. If it were, it would be appropriate to source a portion of the royalties
to the location of the licensing activities. See supra note 366 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 234 and accompanying text; cf Lokken, Intellectual
Property, supra note 57, at 242 (acknowledging that with regard to royalty income
received from the license of intangible property developed by the taxpayer, both the
country that was the situs of development activities and the country where the
intangible is used provide important services and protections).
373. In this regard, commentators have recognized the conceptual basis for
dividing the source of such royalty income between the country of development and
country of use, but declined to do so mainly for administrative reasons. See ALI
PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 48; Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at
242-43.
374. Other commentators have also proposed using the same rule to source
both royalties and intangible gains. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 47-50;
Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 244. Unlike the proposal here, these
commentators would use the place of use rule to source both items. See id. Under
current U.s. law, intangible gains are sourced the same as royalties only where the
gains are contingent on the productivity, use or disposition of the intangible. See
I.R.C. § 865(d)(I).
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source of the gain should be divided among the taxpayer's country of
residence, the country (or possibly countries375) where the development
activities took place, and the country where the intangible will be used.376
Again, fixed percentages should be used to divide the income.
The same reasons that support this approach for royalties also apply
with respect to intangible gains. A taxpayer who realizes gain on the sale of
an intangible receives public benefits from the country from which the
intangible derives its legal protection; without this protection, which is a
product of the laws and legal system of the country providing it, the
intangible would lack value and the gain would not be realized. 377 And where
the taxpayer has developed the intangible, whether the intangible is licensed
or sold, the country where significant development activities take place
provides imf.0rtant public benefits that relate to the taxpayer's ability to earn
the income. 78 An additional reason for applying the same source rule for
royalties and intangible gains is that this approach will avoid the difficult
issue of determining whether a transfer of an intangible should be
characterized as a license or a sale.379 Indeed, with the proposed rule for
service income, the same or similar source rules would apply to royalties,
intangible gains, and service income, Pcutting considerably less stress on
property/service characterization issues. 3 0

375. See supra note 370.
376. This assumes that the sales transaction is not in connection with an
active business. If it were, it would be appropriate to source a portion of the gain to
the location ofthe sales activities.
377. See Lokken, Intellectual Property, supra note 57, at 244 (in proposing
that intangible gains should be sourced based on where the intangible will be used,
pointing out the importance of the services and protections provided by the country
in which the intangible is exploited).
378. See id. (in considering but ultimately rejecting an approach dividing
intangible gain between the country of development and country of the sale, noting
that the services and protections provided by the country that is the location of
development activities can be viewed as significant factors in creating the
intangible).
379. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 47.
380. Cf id. at 53-57 (discussing these difficulties). In this regard, the
Treasury has issued regulations that attempt to address these characterization issues
in the context of transactions involving computer programs. See Reg. § 1.861-18.
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E. Income from the Sale ofInventory
In using the standard to devise a source rule for income from the sale
of inventory, it is important to distinguish between situations where the
taxpayer purchased the inventory and where the taxpayer produced the
inventory. For purchased inventory, the source of the inventory income
should be divided among the taxpayer's country of residence, the country or
countries where significant sales activities take place, and the country in
which the inventory is used or consumed. Fixed percentages should be used
to divide the income. The portion assigned to the location of sales activities
should be further apportioned between two or more countries where
significant sales activities related to the transaction occur in multiple
countries;381 such apportionment should probably be done based on the ratio
of arm's length charges for the activities at the different locations, although
the use of fixed percentages may be an acceptable alternative. This source
rule recognizes the related public benefits provided to the taxpayer by each
of the residence, activities, and destination countries?82
Where the taxpayer produced the inventory, the source of the
inventory income should be divided among the taxpayer's country of
residence, the country (or countries) where significant production activities
take place, the country (or countries) where significant sales activities take
place, and the country in which the inventory is used or consumed. In this
situation, portions of the inventory income would be assigned to two
different types of activities - production and sales. Fixed percentages
should be used to allocate the inventory income among the three categories
of countries: that is, a certain percentage of the income should be assigned to
the residence country, a certain percentage of the income should be assigned
to the destination country, and a certain percentage of the income should be
assigned to the countries where production and sales activities occur. It
would then be necessary to further divide the portion of the income assigned
to production and sales activities. As mentioned previously, it would be

381. This can occur where one branch is performing a wholesaling function
and another is performing a retail selling function; it can also occur where the
taxpayer is either a wholesaler or a retailer, but different functions are performed at
different branches - for example, storage and shipping at one branch with
solicitation and negotiation at another branch.
382. In this regard, the American Law Institute found that it may be
appropriate for inventory income to be sourced in either the activities country or the
destination country in light of the related public benefits provided by each of these
countries. See ALI PROJECT I, supra note 14, at 20. Ultimately, the All settled on a
recommended rule that focuses primarily on the country where the sales activities
take place, but gives weight to the destination country in certain situations. See id. at
23.
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advisable to do so based on the ratio of arm's length charges for the
production and sales activities. 383
As previously discussed,384 the destination country should have the
right to tax a portion of the inventory income because the taxpayer accesses
this country's market by selling goods to consumers and businesses located
therein. Since a country's market is in large part a product of government
activities, the destination country is providing the taxpayer with important
public benefits that justify source taxation. And this holds true even when the
taxpayer has no physical presence in the destination country. Nevertheless, it
may be difficult for the destination country to enforce a source tax where
goods are sold remotely to individual consumers, such as in the case of
electronic commerce. Consequently, as with remote services, applying the
destination component of the source rule to remote sales of consumer goods
would need to be conditioned on the creation of adequate mechanisms for
enforcing a source taX. 385

v.

CONCLUSION

The current source of income rules used in the United States and
other countries are crucial to the functioning of the international tax rules
because they essentially establish the contours of tax jurisdiction that is
exercised by countries. However, the current approach for sourcing income
suffers from a lack of coherence and international conformity. This Article
addresses both of these problems by offering an equity-based approach for sourcing income that has the potential for being adopted by countries on a
multilateral basis. By basing the source rules on a benefits principle-based
standard that allows income source to be divided when appropriate, this
Article seeks to rationalize and harmonize the provisions used to source
income for purposes of taxing cross-border investment and business
activities.

383. Where production activities occur at more than one location, the
portion assigned to production activities should be further divided. An asset-based
apportionment method could be used for this purpose. See Reg. § 1.863-3(c)
(employing this approach under current U.S. law).
384. See supra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
385. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.

